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Abstract
This dissertation addresses the questions of what kind of political information is provided
by media outlets and how media environments affect electoral politics.
In my first essay, I investigate the effect of the entry of television on U.S. presidential
elections from 1944 to 1964. I first show that television increases the importance of the
national economy. Second, I show that television weakens the relationship between the
circulation of partisan newspapers and the party vote share. In addition, I show that the
crowding out of political information by television does not drive these results. I find that
television is not associated with a drop in newspaper circulation and people are just as likely
to read about campaigns in newspapers when television becomes available. These findings
suggest that television can be a valuable source of political information.
In the second essay, coauthored with A´ngela Fonseca Galvis and James Snyder, we study
the effect of competition on media bias in the context of U.S. newspapers in the period 1870–
1910. Our results indicate that partisan newspapers cover scandals involving the opposition
party’s politicians more intensely and cover scandals involving their own party’s politicians
more lightly. More importantly, we find evidence that competition decreases the degree
of media bias. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a monopoly
position, a newspaper facing two competitors will on average exhibits less than 50% as much
overall bias in coverage intensity.
In the third essay, I study whether newspaper coverage of scandals can help voters punish
the party of politicians involved in a scandal. I focus on the US House of Representatives from
1982 to 2004. I use the congruence between newspaper markets and congressional districts
as a measure of newspaper coverage of scandals. I show that newspapers write more stories
about representatives involved in a scandal in districts that are more congruent. I find that
iii
the parties in scandals suffer moderately in elections. More importantly, my results suggest
that the parties in scandal do worse in districts/counties with higher congruence: they get
fewer votes and are less likely to win.
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Chapter 1. The Effect of Television on Electoral Politics
Television caused a dramatic change in media environment. People started receiving political
information from the new media that differed in many ways from previous media, most
notably the press. I focus on two features of political information on television that stem
from the ability of television to cover relatively large and heterogeneous geographic areas.
First, since television stations provide news to a broad audience, they would spend more time
covering national rather than local issues. Second, political information would conceivably
be politically more neutral, as the audience of television has diverse political preferences
and the Communications Act of 1934 requires that television stations should provide equal
opportunities to any political candidates. Consistent with these conjectures, I find that
during the 1960 presidential election cycle television exclusively covered national politicians
and television coverage of the two major parties was fairly balanced.
How did this change in media environment affect electoral politics? First, I find evidence
that television increases the saliency of national issues in presidential elections, in particular
the national economy. I also find that television does not affect how people vote based on the
state economy, which is consistent with the hypothesis that television increases the saliency
of national issues by providing national news. Second, I present evidence that television
decreases the effect of the partisan press. I find that television weakens the relationship
between the circulation of partisan newspapers and the party vote share.
I explore the possibility that the results are driven by crowding out of political information
(e.g., Gentzkow 2006). If people substituted television for local newspapers, they would
receive less political information, especially on local politics, and therefore vote based on
national rather and local issues. Similarly, the effects of the partisan press may decrease
because newspaper readership falls when television enters the local media market. I find
little support for this hypothesis. I show that the entry of television is not associated with
1
a sharp drop in newspaper circulation, and people continue to read about campaigns from
newspapers even after they have access to television. The results suggest that television
affects voters by adding new political information that is nationally oriented and less partisan.
Political Information on Television
In this section, I provide background information on how television covers politics and how
the political information on television differs from what is in newspapers.
Before television and radio, media markets were basically local newspaper markets. They
were relatively small and typically confined to a single county.1 If media outlets cater to the
preference of their consumers, as previous studies show (e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010;
Puglisi and Snyder 2011; Gentzkow et al. 2011), then local newspapers would have strong
incentives to provide local news and tailor their stories to the partisan tastes of their readers.
In contrast, television stations cover much larger and more heterogeneous geographic
areas. In 1970, the mean of the number of counties that belonged to a single television
media market was 15 and the median was 12.2 The size of the market can affect the type
of information provided by television. Since television stations provide news to more people
with diverse tastes, I expect political information from television to be more about national
rather than local issues, and politically neutral compared to newspapers.
Ideally, analyzing contents of television news programs would allow us to investigate what
type of political information television provided. Unfortunately, television scripts data is not
available for the sample period of this study. However, the Federal Communications Com-
missions (FCC) published the Survey of Political Broadcasting during the 1960 presidential
election cycle (September 1 – November 8, 1960), which can give us a sense of how television
1As explained in Appendix A.1.1.3, it is reasonable to assume that most counties get their copies from
in-county newspapers.
2I used the Areas of Dominance Influence (ADI), constructed by Arbitron, from Broadcast and Cable
(1970) for television market definition. According to the definition, each county is assigned to one media
market based on the geographic distribution of television viewers. The data is kindly provided by James
Snyder.
2
covered politics.
The commission sent out surveys to four national radio networks, three national TV
networks, and 4,590 commercial broadcasting stations (3,374 AM radio stations, 700 FM
stations, and 515 TV stations) to obtain information about political broadcasting activities
of radio and television stations.3 About 92% of surveys were returned on time (4,202 stations)
and were included in the report. The commission’s survey contains state-by-state data on
appearances by candidates for president, vice president, senator, U.S. representative, and
governor on broadcasting media.
Table 1.1: Appearances by Candidates on Television during the 1960 Presidential Election
Office Total Hours Appearances
President 5,237 40,865
Vice President 1,192 7,329
U.S. Representative 398 1,309
Governor 411 1,117
Senator 342 599
Combined (P+VP) 6,429 48,194
Combined (H+G+S) 1,151 3,025
The first column shows the total hours candidates appeared on television programs for more than five minutes
and the second the number of times candidates appeared in programs for less than five minutes. The last
two rows present the numbers totaled for president and vice president, U.S. representative, governor, and
senator respectively.
We can notice two things from the survey. First, during the 1960 election cycle, television
stations exclusively covered national politicians: presidential and vice presidential candi-
dates. Table 1.1 shows television appearances by candidates for president, vice president,
U.S. representative, governor, and senator. The first column shows the total hours candidates
appeared on television programs for more than five minutes and the second the number of
times candidates appeared in programs for less than five minutes. The last two rows present
for comparison the numbers totaled by president and vice president, U.S. representative,
governor, and senator respectively.
3One of the purposes of the report was to help the Congress in its consideration of Section 315 of the
Communications Act, which will be explained in detail below.
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The first column in Table 1.1 shows that presidential and vice presidential candidates
appeared about 5.6 times more often than candidates for U.S. representative, governor, and
senator combined on television programs. The difference between presidential candidates and
candidates for other offices is even greater in short appearances, as the second column shows.
If we assume that the minutes of short appearances are evenly distributed with the mean
value of 2, then the total hours of appearances by presidential and vice presidential candidates
would be 8,035 (6, 429 + 48, 194/60 × 2) and the total hours of appearances by candidates
for U.S. representative, governor, and senator would be 1,252 (1151 + 3, 025/60 × 2). This
would suggest presidential and vice presidential candidates appeared about 6.4 times more
often.
To see how this result compares to newspaper coverage of politicians, I searched newspa-
perarchive.com for articles that mentioned candidates for president and governor during the
same period: September 1 - November 7, 1960.4 Specifically, I searched for articles that men-
tioned the word “election” and one of the last names of the candidates from the two major
parties. The sample includes 292 newspapers published in 26 states. I found 22,725 arti-
cles that mentioned presidential candidates and 10,021 articles that mentioned gubernatorial
candidates. Although the sample from newspaperarchive.com may not be representative of
the newspapers in the U.S., the result can shed some light on how newspapers and televisions
cover politics differently. While presidential candidates appear on television about 13 times
more than gubernatorial candidates,5 they are mentioned by newspapers only twice as much
as gubernatorial candidates.
Second, the television coverage of two major parties was fairly balanced. The Communica-
tions Act of 1934 states that radio and television stations should provide equal opportunities
to any political candidates (the “equal-opportunities” provision of Section 315).6 Although
4I restrict the search until a day before the election day to exclude articles that report election results.
5In terms of the total hours of appearances on programs that lasted more than five minutes: 5,237 hours
for presidential candidates and 411 hours for gubernatorial candidates.
6Before the 1959 amendment to section 315, which gives exemptions to certain programs, the “equal-
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Senate Joint Resolution 207 suspended the provision during the 1960 presidential election
cycle, state-by-state appearances of presidential candidates from the two major parties in
television programs were relatively even.
To assess how television stations covered the presidential candidates of the two major
parties, I totaled all the hours each candidate appeared on television for more than five
minutes in each state,7 and calculated the following measure,
RelativeDemAppearances =
DemHourss
DemHourss +RepHourss
,
where s indexes state. The mean of this score is .539 with a standard deviation of .035
(minimum and maximum are .458 and .629 respectively).8 I find no evidence that this score
is positively correlated with political preference of voters in each state. I calculated the
Democratic share of the two party votes in presidential elections averaged over the years
1956 and 1960. The correlation between the relative appearance score and the Democratic
vote share is .078.9 Figure 1.1 shows this graphically. There is no linear relationship between
political preference and relative coverage of politicians at the state level.
On the contrary, newspaper coverage of politicians was more partisan. To measure parti-
san bias of newspapers, I count the number of articles mentioning Democratic and Repub-
lican presidential candidates for every presidential year from 1944 to 1960 and calculate the
opportunities” provision of Section 315 read as follows:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public
office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candi-
dates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
7Unfortunately, station level data is not available.
8Delaware and New Jersey are excluded as no station in those two states reported presidential candidates’
appearances that lasted more than five minutes.
9Alaska and Hawaii are not included because they were not part of the union in 1956. Louisiana and
Mississippi are excluded due to a strong presence of the third party candidate in those states. The result
looks similar when I include the two states.
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Figure 1.1: Candidate Appearances on TV and Voter Preference in 1960
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This figure shows the relationship between the relative television appearances of the Democratic candidate
for president and the Democratic vote share at the state level in 1960. Data on candidate appearances is
from FCC (1961).
relative frequency of articles about Democratic candidates.10 More specifically, let HitsDit
(HitsRit) be the number of articles published by newspaper i about the Democratic (Repub-
lican) candidate running for president in year t. I define
RelativeDemHitsit =
HitsDit
HitsDit +Hits
R
it
.
I regress RelativeDemHitsit on the Democratic share of the two party votes in presiden-
tial elections, measured at the county level as I defined newspaper market to be a county,
and party affiliation of newspapers.11
10Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011) also use a similar measure for political slant of newspaper
coverage.
11I code party affiliation as 1 if newspaper i is classified as Democrat by Editor and Publisher Yearbook,
6
While candidate appearances on television in 1960 show no pattern of partisan bias,
newspaper coverage of politicians is correlated with partisan preference of newspaper readers.
The correlation between the relative newspaper coverage and the Democratic vote share
is .464. As Figure 1.2 shows, newspaper coverage of politicians during the campaign is
positively correlated with voter preference measured at the county level.
Figure 1.2: Newspaper Coverage of Candidates and Voter Preference
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This figure shows the relationship between the relative newspaper coverage of the Democratic candidate for
president and the Democratic vote share at the county level. Data on newspaper coverage of presidential
candidates is from newspaperarchive.com for the period 1944–1960.
Table 1.2 shows the regression results.12 Columns (1) to (3) present the results from
regressions of relative hits on the Democratic vote share and party affiliation of newspapers.
The coefficients of the Democratic vote share and political affiliation of newspapers are
-1 if it is classified as Republican, and 0 otherwise. There are 55 newspapers classified as Democrat and 85
newspapers classified as Republican in the sample. Appendix Table A.1 presents summary statistics. For
data description, see Appendix A.1.
12To control for time-specific national shocks, I include year fixed effects in all specifications.
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statistically significant at .05 level in all specifications. The results show that voter preference
and newspapers’ partisan leanings are positively correlated with reporting bias, although the
effects are not large in magnitude.
Table 1.2: Partisan Behavior of Newspapers
Dependent Var = Relative Dem Hits
(1) (2) (3)
Democratic Vote Share 0.087 0.079
(0.013) (0.013)
Party 0.014 0.008
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 649 649 649
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by newspaper. Year fixed effects included in all columns. The time
period is 1944–1960.
The estimate in column (1) indicates that on average a Democratic newspaper devoted
2.8% more articles to Democratic presidential candidates than a Republican newspaper.
Column (2) suggests that a newspaper in the most pro-Democratic county in the sample,
where a Democratic candidate received 96% of the two party votes, would publish 6% more
articles about Democratic candidates than newspapers in the most pro-Republican county,
where a Republican candidate received 82% of the votes. The results are similar when I
include the two variables together as shown in column (3).
The measure of media bias used in this section is rather crude, as the amount of articles
does not tell us how candidates are covered. Media bias, measured in this way, is likely to
be more difficult to detect compared to other types of media bias documented in previous
studies such as agenda-setting behavior (e.g., Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2011; Puglisi and
Snyder 2011) and the use of partisan language (e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010),13 because
presidential election is a newsworthy event and newspapers would have an incentive to cover
presidential candidates from both parties. Therefore, the current measure would work against
13Text analysis would be ideal to document these types of media bias, but, unfortunately, the access to
the texts in newspapers in the data source used in this study, newspaperarchive.com, is quite limited.
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finding positive results. But the results in Table 1.2 are consistent with newspapers devoting
more news space to their favorite candidates.
The Effect of Television on Electoral Politics
Previous studies suggest that a change in media environment can have a significant impact
on politics. Scholars have analyzed entries and exits of various media outlets – newspa-
pers (Mondak 1995; George and Waldfogel 2008; Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson 2011;
Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido 2013), radio (Stro¨mberg 2004a; Campante and Hojman 2013),
television (Gentzkow 2006; Prat and Stro¨mberg 2006; Campante and Hojman 2013; Drago,
Nannicini and Sobbrio 2014), cable television (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Prior 2007),
and internet (Bauernschuster, Falck and Woessmann 2014; Campante, Durante and Sobbrio
2014; Falck, Gold and Heblich 2014) – and have shown that they affect voter behavior and
public policy.
As the results of the previous section illustrate, the entry of television brings nationally
oriented and politically neutral information to voters. What are the political implications
of this change in information environment? In this paper, I investigate the following hy-
potheses. First, by providing national news, television would increase the saliency of the
national issues. Consistent with this expectation, previous studies show that the national
forces in U.S. presidential elections became more important from the beginning of the 20th
century through the 1950s (Bartels 1998; Aguiar-Conraria, Magalha˜es and Soares 2013),
which coincides with the rise of broadcasting media. In particular, I focus on the national
economy. Scholars have shown that media provide voters with information about the state
of the economy (Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg 2011), shape their retrospective as-
sessments of the economy and influence vote choice (Hetherington 1996; Nadeau et al. 1999;
Sanders and Gavin 2004), and translate their personal experience or perceptions of the econ-
omy into political preferences (Mutz 1992; 1994). Although voters can get a sense of how
9
the national economy is doing based on their personal experiences (e.g., Reeves and Gimpel
2012), media is the only reliable source of information about the overall state of the national
economy. Therefore, I expect television to increase the importance of the national economy
in presidential elections. More specifically, television would help incumbent presidents, or
candidates from the incumbent party, during an economic boom and hurt them during a
recession (Television and Economic Voting Hypothesis).
Second, since television provides politically neutral news to voters, it would decrease the
effect of the partisan press. Although local newspapers were becoming more independent
since the late 19th century (e.g., Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin. 2006; Petrova 2011), they
were still highly partisan during the period of this study, 1944–1964 (e.g., Ansolabehere,
Lessem and Snyder 2006). Furthermore, according to Editor and Publisher Yearbook, more
than 20 percent of all the dailies during this period were affiliated with one of the two major
political parties.14
Researchers have documented the effect of partisan media on voters’ choices (e.g., Erikson
1976; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Ladd and Lenz 2009; Chiang and Knight 2011; Leite
Lopez de Leon 2013).15 Partisan media can be detrimental to voters especially when they
suppress information to promote their political agenda (e.g., Puglisi and Snyder 2011). The
formal model in Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2008) discusses how media bias can cause a
failure of information aggregation and lead voters to choose the candidate whom they would
not have chosen had they received unbiased news. The effect of biased media, however, can be
mitigated when voters have an additional source of political information. The Mullainathan
and Shleifer (2005) model predicts that “conscientious readers,” who gather information
from multiple media outlets, may reduce the effect bias when they have access to multiple
sources of information. Therefore, I expect the effect of partisan newspaper to decrease when
television enters a newspaper market (Television and Partisan Newspaper Hypothesis). In
14For more details about the data, see Appendix A.1.1.
15In contrast, Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson (2011) find evidence that the entry of newspapers increases
turnout, they conclude that there is no evidence that partisan newspapers affect party vote shares.
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a similar vein, Campante and Hojman (2013) presents evidence that television decreased
ideological polarization among U.S. representatives.
Television and Economic Voting16
To test the first hypothesis (Television and Economic Voting), I estimate a regression of the
following form:
Incumbent V otect = β1 TVct + β2 ∆National Econt +
β3 TVct×∆National Econt + γ′Xct + ct, (1)
where Incumbent V otect is the share of the two party vote received by the candidate from
the incumbent party running for president in county c in year t and ∆National Econt is
one-year change in national economic indicators.17 The vector Xct includes fixed effects
and county level demographic control variables: the total population, population per square
mile, the share of white population, the share of females, the share of population living in
cities with 25,000 or more people, population aged 25 and older with more than 12 years of
education as a share of all the population aged 25 and older, and the log of total dollar value
of manufacturing output per-capita.18
In the baseline specification, I include county and year fixed effects. The county fixed
effects control for time-invariant county attributes19 and the year fixed effects capture time-
16For data description and summary statistics, see Appendix A.1.
17I use two indicators of the national economy: one-year percentage growth in national real per capita
income and one-year change in unemployment rate. One-year percent change in unemployment rate is coded
such that positive values indicate an improving economy.
18Alternatively, I can allow the demographic characteristics of counties before television was introduced to
affect the vote differently before and after television. Specifically, I first fix the demographic control variables
at the year 1944, when all the counties in the sample did not have television. Then, I interact these variables
with TVct and include these interaction terms as controls. Note that the main effect of the control variables
are excluded with the inclusion of county fixed effects. The results, available upon request, remain similar.
19County fixed effects capture the tendency to vote for the incumbent. To control for underlying partisan-
ship of each county, I interact county-fixed effects with a variable indicating the party of incumbent president
11
specific national shocks, such as popularity of candidates or national events that help or hurt
the incumbent. Note that the main effect of ∆National Econt is omitted with the inclusion
of the year fixed effects. In some specifications, I include ∆National Econt variable and drop
the year fixed effects.20 I standardize ∆National Econt variable before running regressions,
to make the interpretation of the results easier.
The effect of television on economic voting is estimated by β3. As previously discussed, I
expect television to increase the importance of the national economy. β3 > 0 would indicate
that an improving national economy increased the vote share received by the incumbent
party when television became available.
The assumption behind this identification strategy is that the introduction of television
is largely exogenous. According to Gentzkow (2006), two key factors in the introduction of
television in the U.S. help the identification strategy. The first is that two plausibly exogenous
events, World War II and the television license freeze imposed by the FCC, delayed the
expansion of television. During the World War II, the government banned the construction
of new television stations. After the war, television expanded rapidly, causing excessive
interference of spectrums. In September 1948, the FCC announced a freeze on new television
licenses, because it was unable to resolve interference issue at the time. This “freeze” on
new license lasted until April 1952.21
The second factor is that each television station broadcasts to heterogeneous counties. For
instance, Gentzkow (2006) shows that Chicago DMA includes Newton County, IN – a rural,
sparsely populated, and relatively poor county – and Cook County, IL – an urban, densely
populated, and wealthy county. Therefore, he claims that even though the introduction of
television might be related to the characteristics of the DMA as a whole, such as wealth and
(1 for Democrats and -1 for Republicans). The results, available upon request, remain similar when I use
this alternative specification.
20The results remain similar when I drop the year fixed effects.
21There were new television stations entering the market during the freeze period as they received their
licenses before the freeze.
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population, it would likely to be unrelated to unobserved characteristics of counties far from
the cities where television stations are located.
To ensure that the results are not driven by the difference between the counties that
had television earlier and those that had it later, I include demographic control variables
in all specifications. In addition, to exploit the fact that each television market includes
a heterogeneous set of counties, I match the pre-freeze counties, where television entered
before the freeze ended (April 1952), to post-freeze counties, where television was introduced
after the freeze, on eight covariates, described as demographic control variables in the text
following equation (1).22
Although control variables and matching address the concern that the results are due
to observed differences between counties that had television earlier and later, there might
be unobserved characteristics that bias the estimates. Therefore, I restrict the sample to
the pre-freeze counties that are happened to be located around the center of each media
market and their neighbors that did not have television before the freeze. More specifically,
I pair each pre-freeze county to one post-freeze county based on geographic proximity and
demographic similarity. This removes all the media centers and isolated pre and post-freeze
counties from the sample. By restricting the sample to these paired counties, I rule out
the possibility that the results are driven by observed and unobserved characteristics of the
pre and post-freeze counties. Further information on this pairing procedure can be found in
Appendix A.2.2.
In addition, I address the concern that unobserved trends might bias the estimates. Con-
sider, for instance, counties with a trend toward the Republican Party. In the sample, the
Democratic Party was the incumbent party in earlier years, 1944–1952, and the Republican
Party was the incumbent party in later years, 1956–1960. Therefore, time trends in these
counties are likely to be positively correlated with pro-incumbent voting patterns. Since the
22I did one to one propensity score matching with a caliper of 0.05. I also tried different calipers and the
results were similar. All the results using matched sample are presented in Appendix A.2.1.
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entry of television is also positively correlated with time trends as counties move from no
television to television, the estimate of β3 can be upward biased. Similarly, the existence
of counties with pro-Democratic trends would bias the estimate downward. To address this
concern, I include county-specific time trends, allowing me to control for linear time trends
in each county.23
Finally, I also use a specification where I include state-specific year fixed effects to control
for unobserved state-specific factors that might influence the vote share and the introduction
of television over time.
Table 1.3 presents the results.24 In columns (1)–(4) I use one-year change in per capita
income and in columns (5)–(8) I use one-year change in national unemployment rate. The
results suggest that television increases the saliency of the national economy. The coefficient
of TV×∆National Econ is statistically significant and large in magnitude in all specifications.
Suppose a television station enters a market in a relatively good year. Let one-year
change in national per capita income be one standard deviation above the mean (5% growth).
According to the estimates in column (2), television increases the vote share of the incumbent
party by 4.2% (4.5− 0.3). The magnitude differs depending on specifications but the effect
is substantial in all cases. It ranges from 2.2 to 4.8%.
The results are similar when I use one-year change in unemployment.25 When television
becomes available in a relatively good year (0.4% decrease in unemployment rate), it increases
the vote share of the incumbent party by 1.4 to 10.2 percentage points. The estimate in
column (5) is less reliable because it does not control for year-specific national shocks. More
reliable estimates indicate the effect of television on vote share in a good year ranges from
23Specifically, I estimate a regression of the following form:
Incumbent V otect = α0c + α1c t+ θt + β1 TVct + β2 TVct×∆National Econt + γ′Xct + ct,
where α0c is a county-specific intercept, θt is a year-specific intercept, and α1c t is a county-specific time
trend. The main effect of ∆National Econt is absorbed by the year fixed effects.
24Appendix Table A.2 provides summary statistics of the variables before standardization.
25The sample size is different because the year 1944 is excluded. As mentioned in Appendix A.1.1,
unemployment data for 1944 is not comparable to other years.
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Table 1.3: Economic Voting and TV in Presidential Elections
Dependent Var = Incumbent Vote Share
Per Capita Income (1944–1964) Unemployment (1948–1964)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TV -1.222 -0.347 0.276 0.789 2.290 -2.991 -0.476 -0.602
(0.758) (0.694) (0.553) (0.654) (0.739) (0.793) (0.655) (0.900)
∆National Income -0.360
(0.171)
TV × ∆National Income 3.439 4.498 1.990 4.010
(0.230) (0.615) (0.535) (0.580)
∆National Unemployment -6.014
(0.530)
TV × ∆National Unemployment 7.919 4.376 2.532 5.141
(0.554) (0.880) (0.791) (0.999)
Control Variables
Population (Thousand) -0.018 -0.020 -0.001 -0.042 -0.016 -0.021 -0.001 -0.102
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.026) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.055)
Pct. Female 1.280 2.255 -1.220 -0.988 2.020 1.144 -1.319 -2.781
(0.369) (0.350) (0.425) (0.617) (0.344) (0.354) (0.483) (1.575)
Pct. Urban 0.036 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.032 0.028 0.020 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Population Per sq. Mile 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005)
Pct. White -2.752 -2.649 0.187 3.550 -1.640 -1.488 0.418 6.894
(0.203) (0.194) (0.124) (0.518) (0.216) (0.223) (0.152) (1.025)
Pct. 21+ -2.466 -1.901 0.320 -0.962 -2.413 -2.243 0.166 -1.562
(0.133) (0.147) (0.116) (0.456) (0.141) (0.144) (0.122) (0.840)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.155 0.628 -0.117 -1.693 -0.095 -0.608 -0.227 -3.236
(0.065) (0.130) (0.097) (0.218) (0.069) (0.146) (0.111) (0.408)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.182 0.898 1.999 3.016 1.219 0.677 1.776 4.702
(0.584) (0.592) (0.407) (0.957) (0.585) (0.603) (0.460) (1.492)
Fixed Effects County County County County County County County County
Year State-Year Year Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 14881 14881 14881 14881 12561 12561 12561 12561
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. ∆National Income and ∆National Unemployment are
standardized.
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1.4 to 4.5 percentage points.
Table 1.3 shows that the effect of the national economy on the vote share of the incum-
bent presidential party increases when television becomes available. However, a possible
alternative explanation to these results is that early television adopting counties are becom-
ing more tied to the national economy. For instance, if the relationship between the state
and the national economy becomes stronger after television enters, people would vote with
the national economy more because their state economy are more affected by the national
economy not because they get more information about the national economy from television.
In Appendix A.2.3.1, I present evidence that the effect of the national economy on the state
economy does not become stronger after the entry of television.
In addition, I test whether television affects how people vote based on the state economy.
Previous studies suggest that people use local information to assess the state of the national
economy (e.g., Reeves and Gimpel 2012). If television increases the saliency of the national
economy by providing information about national politics, it should not affect the importance
of the state economy.
To examine whether television affects how people vote based on the state economy I
include the state level economy variable. I estimate the model of the following form,
Incumbent V otect = β1 TVct + β2∆National Econt + β3 TVct×∆National Econt +
β4 ∆StateEconst + β5TVct×∆StateEconst + γ′Xct + ct, (2)
where s indexes state.
The results are shown in Table 1.4.26 In columns (1)–(4) I use state income variable
and in columns (5)–(8) I also include national income variable. Columns (5)–(8) confirm
the findings in Table 1.3: holding ∆National Income at one standard deviation above the
mean value, television would increase the vote share of the incumbent party by 2.5 to 4.1
26I only use one-year change in per capita income, because unemployment data at the state level is not
available for the period of this study.
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percentage points.
Interestingly, television does not affect how people vote based on the state economy. Al-
though the coefficient of TV ×∆State Income is positive in columns (1)–(4), it becomes
insignificant with the inclusion of TV ×∆National Income except in column (8). The coef-
ficient in column (8) is substantially smaller than the coefficient of TV×∆National Income
variable.
Although the findings in this section have implications for democracy, I remain neutral
about whether they are good or bad news. On one hand, consistent with the literature on
the role of information in improving political accountability (e.g., Snyder and Stro¨mberg
2010), my findings suggest that better access to political news can help voters hold politi-
cians accountable. On the other, the results can be interpreted as additional evidence that
the media induce voters to base their decisions on the election-year economy (e.g., Healy and
Lenz 2014), which may provide greater incentive to politicians to manipulate the economy
and create an election-year boom, as the literature on political business cycle suggests (e.g.,
Drazen 2001). Since national economic conditions are influenced by events beyond politi-
cians’ control, such as oil shocks, the results may also imply that voters reward and punish
incumbent politicians based on their lucks (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2004). The welfare con-
sequences of television would depend on factors such as how much control politicians have
over the economy and whether the election-year economy is a good indicator of the future
economy.
Television and Partisan Newspapers27
To test whether television decreases the association between of partisan newspapers and the
vote (Television and Partisan Newspaper Hypothesis), I estimate models of the following
27For data description and summary statistics, see Appendix A.1.
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Table 1.4: Economic Voting and TV in Presidential Elections (with State Economy Variable)
Dependent Var = Incumbent Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TV -1.108 -0.921 0.054 0.484 -0.710 -0.409 0.240 0.836
(0.698) (0.683) (0.556) (0.636) (0.742) (0.700) (0.555) (0.656)
∆State Income 2.130 1.715 0.312 2.339 1.753 0.336
(0.175) (0.151) (0.097) (0.171) (0.152) (0.096)
TV × ∆State Income 1.417 0.858 0.499 1.310 -0.450 0.475 -0.854 0.980
(0.301) (0.337) (0.633) (0.337) (0.345) (0.336) (0.793) (0.344)
∆National Income -1.018
(0.155)
TV × ∆National Income 3.164 3.624 2.396 3.341
(0.253) (0.623) (0.675) (0.603)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.018 -0.020 -0.000 -0.038 -0.018 -0.021 -0.000 -0.041
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.025) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.026)
Pct. Female 1.171 2.041 -1.214 -1.066 1.152 2.029 -1.224 -1.052
(0.360) (0.348) (0.425) (0.615) (0.368) (0.348) (0.425) (0.615)
Pct. Urban 0.029 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.034 0.002 0.010 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Population Per sq. Mile 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Pct. White -2.624 -2.585 0.186 3.445 -2.644 -2.577 0.187 3.473
(0.196) (0.192) (0.124) (0.515) (0.198) (0.192) (0.124) (0.515)
Pct. 21+ -2.106 -1.784 0.314 -0.853 -2.253 -1.774 0.323 -0.868
(0.128) (0.144) (0.116) (0.452) (0.133) (0.145) (0.116) (0.454)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.211 0.561 -0.120 -1.690 0.177 0.562 -0.116 -1.684
(0.063) (0.129) (0.097) (0.217) (0.064) (0.128) (0.097) (0.218)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.507 1.039 2.002 2.976 0.500 1.033 2.000 2.976
(0.571) (0.589) (0.407) (0.956) (0.579) (0.588) (0.407) (0.955)
Fixed Effects County County County County County County County County
Year State-Year Year Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 14881 14881 14881 14881 14881 14881 14881 14881
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. ∆National Income and ∆State Income are standardized.
The time period is 1944–1964.
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form
DemV otect = β1 TVct + β2RelativeDemCircct +
β3 TVct×RelativeDemCircct + γ′Xct + ct, (3)
where DemV otect is the share of the two party vote received by the Democratic candidate
running for president in county c in year t, and RelativeDemCircct is the total circulation
of Democratic newspapers minus the circulation of Republican newspapers divided by the
population in county c in year t. RelativeDemCircct captures the relative strength of
partisan newspapers in each county in each year. The vector Xct includes county level
control variables and fixed effects as described in the text following equation (1).
The influence of partisan newspapers is captured by β2. I expect β2 > 0, which would
imply partisan newspapers affect the party vote share. However, it does not necessarily esti-
mate the causal impact of partisan newspapers on votes, because circulation of Democratic
or Republican newspapers will be large in areas where the share of voters leaning toward the
respective party is higher.
The impact of the introduction of television is estimated by β3. If television mitigated
the effect of partisan newspapers, we will observe β3 < 0, which implies that the correla-
tion between partisan newspapers and vote share became weaker when television entered a
market.
I also report the results from regressions with state-specific year fixed effects as well
as county-specific year trends. Again, to make the interpretation easier I standardize the
relative Democratic newspaper circulation variable before running regressions.28
Table 1.5 presents the results. Columns (1)–(3) show how circulation of partisan news-
papers related to vote share. As expected, the Democratic vote share was higher in counties
with high Democratic newspaper circulation, although the coefficient becomes smaller and
28Summary statistics (before standardization) are presented in Appendix Table A.3.
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statistically insignificant with the inclusion of state-year fixed effects and county-specific
time trends.
Columns (4)–(6) show how television changes the relationship between partisan newspaper
and the vote share. The results show that television reduces the Democratic or Republican
vote share in counties with high Democratic or Republican newspaper circulation respec-
tively. The coefficient of TV×RelativeDemCirc is statistically significant at .05 level in all
specifications.
The point estimates in column (4) suggest that when television is not available, one stan-
dard deviation increase in RelativeDemCirc, .09 more copies of Democratic newspaper per
capita, is associated with an increase in the Democratic vote share by 1.3%. When television
becomes available, however, one standard deviation increase in RelativeDemCirc decreases
the vote share by .1%. Therefore, one standard deviation change in RelativeDemCirc is
associated with 1.4% difference between counties with television and no television.
Consider, for instance, a county with relatively high pro-Democratic newspaper circula-
tion, that is, it has one standard deviation above the mean value (.09 copies of Democratic
newspaper per capita) and the mean county in terms of partisan newspaper circulation (.01
copies of Republican newspaper per capita). According to the point estimates in column (4),
the entry of television narrows the gap in vote share between these two counties by 1.4%.
Figure 1.3 presents this graphically. The figure plots the predicted Democratic vote share
as a function of RelativeDemCirc variable based on the point estimates in column (4) (all
the variables except RelativeDemCirc and TV are held at their mean values). Figure 1.3
shows that television mitigates the effect of partisan newspapers on voters. The interactive
effect of partisan newspaper circulation and television decreases when I include state-year
fixed effects and county-specific time trends, but it is still substantial: television narrows the
gap by .48 to .53%.
An alternative explanation to these findings could be that television enters to places where
newspaper readers are becoming less partisan. In Appendix A.2.3.2, I present evidence that
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Table 1.5: The Effect of Newspaper and TV on Democratic Vote Share in Presidential
Elections
Dependent Var = Democratic Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TV 0.354 0.434 1.172
(0.321) (0.253) (0.338)
Relative Democratic Paper Circ 0.535 0.123 0.133 1.301 0.393 0.415
(0.195) (0.111) (0.185) (0.237) (0.130) (0.220)
TV × Relative Democratic Paper Circ -1.421 -0.492 -0.507
(0.229) (0.130) (0.226)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.010 -0.003 0.041 -0.010 -0.003 0.043
(0.006) (0.002) (0.018) (0.006) (0.002) (0.018)
Pct. Female 0.816 -0.552 0.027 0.709 -0.557 -0.033
(0.420) (0.251) (0.636) (0.408) (0.250) (0.632)
Pct. Urban 0.019 0.010 0.023 0.019 0.010 0.023
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Population Per sq. Mile 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pct. White -0.949 0.002 0.055 -0.934 -0.008 0.059
(0.210) (0.132) (0.541) (0.208) (0.133) (0.541)
Pct. 21+ -1.191 -0.012 -0.365 -1.119 -0.005 -0.425
(0.131) (0.097) (0.271) (0.128) (0.097) (0.269)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.389 -0.179 0.343 0.385 -0.169 0.302
(0.127) (0.086) (0.151) (0.125) (0.085) (0.153)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output -2.731 0.550 1.116 -2.611 0.559 1.138
(0.724) (0.375) (0.758) (0.718) (0.375) (0.757)
Fixed Effects County County County County County County
Year State-Year Year Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 4848 4848 4848 4848 4848 4848
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. Relative Democratic Paper Circ is standardized. The
time period is 1944–1964.
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Figure 1.3: TV and the Effect of Partisan Newspaper on Vote Share
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This figure plots the predicted Democratic vote share as a function of RelativeDemCirc variable based on
the point estimates in column (4) of Table 1.5, holding all the variables except RelativeDemCirc and TV
at the mean values. The time period is 1944–1964.
this is not the case.
The results in this section suggest that television mitigates the effect of the partisan press.
I show that the correlation between the party vote and the circulation of partisan newspaper
decreases when television becomes available. Previous research on media bias reveal that
competition among media outlets can decrease the degree of media bias (e.g., Besley and Prat
2006; Gentzkow 2006).29 Consistent with these studies, the results in this section suggest
that the effect of biased media can be mitigated when voters have an alternative source of
political information.
29On the contrary, theoretical models of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Baron (2006) predict that
media bias would persist, or even become stronger, in competitive media markets.
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Television and Substitution among Media
The results in previous sections suggest that television affects voters by adding new po-
litical information that is nationally oriented and less partisan. In this section, I explore
the alternative hypothesis that the results are driven by crowding out political information
(e.g., Gentzkow 2006). If people substitute television for newspapers, they would receive less
political information, especially on local politics. The national economy may become more
salient because people have less local information. Similarly, the effects of partisan news-
papers may decrease not because people receive new information that is politically neutral
but because they stop reading partisan newspapers. Below, I present evidence contrary to
this hypothesis: television is not associated with a sharp drop in newspaper circulation, and
people continue to read about campaigns from newspapers even after they have access to
television.
I first test whether television caused a drop in newspaper circulation. I regress county
level circulation per thousand on television dummy variable and county-level controls as
in equation (1) with various fixed effects as well as county-specific time trends. To allow
the effect of television to grow over time linearly, following Gentzkow (2006), I also define
TV Y earct = I(t > τc)(t − τc), where τc is the year television is introduced in county c and
I( ) is the indicator function.
Table 1.6 present the results.30 In columns (1)–(3) I use television dummy variable and in
columns (4)–(6) I use television year variable. The estimates suggest television had no effect
on newspaper circulation. The coefficients of TV and TV Y ear variables are not significant
at .05 level in all specifications. This finding is contrary to Gentzkow (2006), who claims that
television decreases newspaper circulation. While the results reported in Gentzkow (2006)
show the difference in circulation per thousand between the states that had television earlier
and the ones where television entered later diminished over time, they do not necessarily
30Summary statistics are provided in Appendix Table A.4.
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Table 1.6: TV and Newspaper Circulation
Dependent Var = Circulation Per Thousand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TV -3.679 -5.335 -1.636
(3.302) (2.673) (3.153)
TV Year -1.712 -1.171 0.055
(1.097) (1.039) (2.863)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Pct. Female 11.110 8.216 9.851 10.926 8.320 9.775
(2.850) (2.826) (5.480) (2.900) (2.834) (5.328)
Pct. Urban -0.028 -0.021 -0.158 -0.029 -0.019 -0.157
(0.042) (0.046) (0.087) (0.042) (0.045) (0.084)
Population Per sq. Mile 0.015 0.017 -0.036 0.017 0.017 -0.036
(0.045) (0.043) (0.168) (0.046) (0.044) (0.169)
Pct. White 0.715 2.515 8.251 0.292 2.316 8.248
(1.299) (1.920) (7.434) (1.382) (1.953) (7.364)
Pct. 21+ 8.075 10.030 9.752 7.894 9.820 9.640
(0.856) (1.035) (3.084) (0.875) (1.066) (3.013)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 1.763 2.099 1.150 1.753 2.052 1.083
(1.085) (0.939) (1.966) (1.095) (0.945) (1.907)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output 4.462 2.316 4.542 4.430 2.480 4.488
(4.052) (4.179) (5.552) (4.039) (4.168) (5.578)
Fixed Effects County County County County County County
Year State-Year Year Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 5484 5484 5484 5484 5484 5484
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. The time period is 1944–1964.
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show that newspaper circulation dropped after the entry of television.
To examine how television affects individuals’ media choice, I use the American National
Election Study (NES) survey data. Following Gentzkow (2006), I use the following questions:
Did you read about the campaign in any newspaper?
Did you watch any programs about the campaign on television?
The independent variables are dummies, which is 1 for positive answers and 0 otherwise. I
regress these variables on TV , county level controls described in the text following equation
(1), and individual level control variables: dummies for white, sex, age 21 to 34, age 65
and above, married, more than high school education, highest income category, and party
identification.
Ideally, we can investigate how individuals change their media consumption behavior when
television becomes available using panel survey data. There is a panel survey data for the
sample period of this study, the NES panel study 1956–1958–1960. But, unfortunately, since
more than 90% of the individuals in the sample of this study belonged to counties where
television were available, there is little variation in the television variable. Instead of using
panel survey, I combine the 1952, 1956, and 1960 NES data and include county fixed effects,
which allow me to control for unobserved county level attributes.
Table 1.7 presents the results.31 Columns (1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6) show the results for
newspaper and television use respectively. Column (1) and (4) replicates Gentzkow (2006),
where I use the year 1952 only. In columns (2)–(3) and (5)–(6), I use the years 1952 to 1960
with year and county fixed effects. The estimates in column (1) are consistent with Gentzkow
(2006) and suggest people living in counties with access to television in 1952 are less likely
to report that they receive campaign information from newspapers.32 However, the effect of
television on newspaper consumption becomes insignificant when I include county and year
31Summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table A.5.
32The estimate are slightly different, possibly due to the fact that I use county level controls while Gentzkow
(2006) use DMA level controls.
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Table 1.7: TV and Media Use
Dependent Var =
Newspaper TV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TV -0.131 -0.087 0.005 0.399 0.362 0.369
(0.035) (0.031) (0.048) (0.057) (0.067) (0.064)
Controls (Individual)
Democrat 0.033 0.039 0.041 0.024 0.045 0.045
(0.030) (0.018) (0.020) (0.031) (0.016) (0.017)
Republican 0.063 0.045 0.045 0.006 0.029 0.011
(0.030) (0.018) (0.019) (0.032) (0.017) (0.016)
Male 0.076 0.094 0.096 0.046 0.032 0.037
(0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014)
White 0.142 0.160 0.162 0.039 0.108 0.134
(0.053) (0.034) (0.037) (0.052) (0.029) (0.028)
Age 21 to 34 -0.080 -0.058 -0.056 -0.020 0.012 0.013
(0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015)
Age 65+ -0.017 -0.013 -0.024 -0.073 -0.069 -0.070
(0.030) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024)
Married 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.099 0.073 0.071
(0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.031) (0.019) (0.020)
High School Education 0.160 0.180 0.170 0.120 0.099 0.096
(0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014)
Highest Income Category 0.015 0.068 0.072 0.056 0.049 0.054
(0.034) (0.021) (0.020) (0.057) (0.023) (0.024)
Controls (County)
Population (Thousand) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pct. Female -0.029 -0.021 -0.017 0.011 0.009 -0.064
(0.010) (0.007) (0.038) (0.016) (0.014) (0.037)
Pct. Urban -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009)
Population Per sq. Mile -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pct. 21+ 0.015 0.006 -0.003 -0.008 0.007 0.022
(0.005) (0.003) (0.015) (0.008) (0.004) (0.015)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.003 0.005 0.020 0.002 -0.000 0.006
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.018 0.026 -0.051 0.076 0.034 0.103
(0.012) (0.007) (0.065) (0.019) (0.010) (0.088)
Fixed Effects County County
Year Year Year Year
Year 1952 1952–1960 1952–1960 1952 1952–1960 1952–1960
Observations 1413 3905 3905 1413 3905 3905
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.
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fixed effects. As shown in column (3), the coefficient of TV is close to zero. This is not likely
due to the measurement errors, which may bias the estimates toward zero. The estimates
in columns (4)–(6) are similar in all specifications: respondents are about 36 to 40% more
likely to report that they receive campaign information from television.
The analyses in this section show that the entry of television did not cause voters to
substitute away from newspapers. I found no evidence that television caused a huge drop in
newspaper circulation. In addition, the evidence from the NES data shows that respondents
are not less likely to receive campaign information from newspapers when they have access
to television.
I do not rule out possibilities that people might pay less attention to local politics or
they might discount local issues when television becomes available.33 But the results in this
section suggest television does not necessarily reduce the amount of available information
about politics.
Conclusion
Scholars have expressed concerns about the negative effects of television on politics. They
have claimed that television steals time from social activities (Putnam 2000) and crowds
out information about local politics (Gentzkow 2006). In this paper, I instead have focused
on what television brings to politics by investigating the impact of nationally oriented and
politically neutral information on electoral politics. I found that when television becomes
available, it increases the incumbent presidential party’s share of the vote when the national
economy is doing well and decreases it when the economy is weak. I also found that the
introduction of television decreases the effect of partisan newspapers on voters. Finally, I
showed that people do not switch from newspaper to television when television enters a
33Consistent with Gentzkow (2006), I find that voters are less likely to name candidates for U.S. represen-
tative correctly when television enters. This result is robust to the inclusion of county and year fixed effects.
The results are available upon request.
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newspaper market. Taken together, the results are consistent with the view that television
provides more information to voters and helps voters in their decision making. They also
suggest that the effect of biased media can be mitigated when voters have an alternative
source of political information.
I do not rule out the possibility that television can still lead to bad decisions. When
voters receive new information filled with images, they may discount other information re-
garding issues and the performance of politicians, and may vote based on more superficial
considerations such as candidates’ appearance (Lenz and Lawson 2011). In addition, as pre-
viously mentioned, television may provide a perverse incentive to politicians to manipulate
the economy to make it look better during election years.
The results of this study suggest, however, that television may not be as detrimental
to voters as previously thought. It can even be beneficial, at least from an informational
perspective. By providing new information to voters, it can assist voters in making more
informed decisions.
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Chapter 2. Newspaper Market Structure and Behavior:
Partisan Coverage of Political Scandals in the U.S. from
1870 to 1910
How does media market structure affect what media outlets do? Does more competition
lead to more intensive and accurate reporting (as in Besley and Prat 2006, and Gentzkow
and Shapiro 2008), more “soft news” rather than “hard news” (as in Zaller 1999), more
product differentiation and market segmentation (as in Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), or
something else?
In this paper, we focus on the effect of competition on partisan bias in coverage. We
investigate this issue in the context of U.S. newspapers around the turn of the 20th century,
from 1870 to 1910. This time period is especially interesting for three reasons: (1) newspapers
and magazines were essentially the only mass media outlets, which means both that there
was considerable variation in the media environment across geographic areas of the U.S., and
that we can measure this variation accurately; (2) most newspapers were highly partisan,
especially during the early part of our period of study; and (3) there was a noticeable
trend towards independent newspapers over the course of the period, and therefore temporal
variation in media market structure that we can exploit.
To measure bias, we focus on the agenda setting behavior of newspapers, that is, the
degree to which journalists and editors cover certain topics while ignoring others, in a way
that favors a political party or ideological position (e.g., Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2011;
Puglisi and Snyder 2011). More specifically, we study the intensity with which different
newspapers cover different scandals. It is relatively easy to identify scandals in a replicable
manner (we use a specific set of sources and search terms to do this), and it is also easy to
count the number of newspaper stories devoted to a given scandal relatively accurately (we
use specific search strings to do this). Also, scandals involving politicians have clear partisan
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implications – they are “bad news” for the individual politicians implicated, and also, by
association, are bad news for the party to which the implicated politicians belong.
Our sample contains 157 newspapers (from the America’s Historical Newspapers online
archive) and 121 scandals. Approximately 60% of the scandals involve Republican politi-
cians. We have collected the data on the number of articles devoted to each scandal in each
newspaper. In addition, we have collected the total number of articles published by each
newspaper during the period of each scandal. We use it to scale the number of articles de-
voted to the scandal itself. We have also collected data on the partisanship and circulation
for all competing newspapers in the towns and counties of each newspaper in our sample.
This allows us to construct measures of the media market structure for each newspaper in
our sample.
Our main results indicate that newspaper bias, both in favor of the newspaper’s political
party and against the opposition party, is statistically significant, substantively meaningful,
and in the expected direction. Partisan newspapers publish more articles about scandals
involving politicians from the opposition party, and they print fewer articles about scandals
involving politicians from their own party, relative to independent newspapers.
Perhaps more interestingly, we also find that as the level of competition faced by a news-
paper increases, the bias exhibited – both against the opposition party and in favor of the
newspaper’s own party – decreases. Consider a newspaper in a monopoly market. On aver-
age, this newspaper would publish 90% more articles when a scandal involves a politician of
the opposite party than when the scandal does not. By contrast, if a newspaper faces four
competitors, then the degree of bias is only half as large as when it faces none. The results
hold strong even after controlling for county level demographics, as well as the underlying
partisanship of voters in each newspaper’s county, and time trends.
We first discuss the existing literature in the following section. Subsequently we describe
the data and empirical strategy. We then present the main results and robustness checks we
implemented. Finally, we conclude with a short discussion of the broader implications of the
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results for research on media competition and bias and possible extensions to our study.
Previous Literature
Scholars have attempted to measure bias in several different ways.34 In this paper, we
measure bias as the degree to which journalists and editors cover certain topics while ignoring
others, in a way that favors a political party or ideological position. A number of previous
studies have documented this type of media bias (e.g., Groeling and Kernell 1998; Groeling
2008; Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2011; Puglisi 2011; Puglisi and Snyder 2011; Soroka
2012).
The agenda setting bias of newspapers can have large effects on voters (e.g., McCombs
and Shaw 1972). In fact, by exploiting their agenda-setting power, actors on the supply
side of the media market can have strong and potentially harmful effects on the audience,
especially if they aim at suppressing information. This is the case, because consumers find
it difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish the scenario “I did not see any news about X
today because nothing important happened regarding X” from the less benign scenario “I
did not see any news about X today because, although something important happened, the
media decided not to publish it.” Game theoretic models by Puglisi (2004), Baron (2006),
Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2008), Anderson and McLaren (2012), and Petrova (2012)
all incorporate precisely this source of media bias, and show its effects on public policy
decisions.35
Why does media bias exist and does competition reduce bias? A number of formal models
provide different accounts of media bias, and make different predictions regarding whether
market competition reduces bias. The model in Baron (2006) gives a supply-side explanation
of why media bias may persist in competitive media markets. According to the model, a news
34For survey of the literature, see Groeling (2013) and Prat and Stromberg (2013).
35Alternatively, media bias can also be formalized in a spatial theory framework (e.g., Duggan and Mar-
tinelli 2011).
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organization may lower the cost of hiring by granting discretion to journalists.36 However,
since skepticism of customers about media bias forces the news organization to lower price,
it tolerates bias only if gains from the supply side is greater than the losses from the demand
side. Therefore, media bias is consistent with profit maximization and may persist with
competition.
On the demand-side, media bias may persist when readers prefer partisan news. In the
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) model, readers hold biased beliefs and want to hear stories
consistent with their prior views. The model predicts an increase in competition may make
media bias even worse, as newspapers cater to the taste of readers more aggressively to
carve out a share of the market and make higher profits. Similarly, the Anand, Di Tella and
Galetovic (2007) model also predicts that competition would not necessarily reduce media
bias. They assume that the facts contained in news are not always fully verifiable. When
the facts are not verifiable, the media market becomes a differentiated product market and
media outlets cater to the preferences of readers. Thus, competition does not eliminate
media bias.
In contrast, competition may decrease media bias if consumers value accuracy. In the
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) model, media bias emerges even when consumers only care
about learning the truth, because media outlets want to slant their reports toward what
customers believe to build a reputation of being accurate. In competitive media markets,
however, readers have alternative sources of information to check the accuracy of a given
outlet, thus media outlets have weaker incentives to distort the news.
On the supply-side, competition may reduce the bias if media bias arises because the
government tries to capture the media. In the Besley and Prat (2006) model, the govern-
ment attempts to bribe media outlets to suppress bad news. When the number of media
outlets increases, however, it becomes more costly for the government to bribe media outlets.
36The assumption is that if journalists can advance their careers or be influential by using the discretion
granted by a news organization, they are willing to work for lower wages.
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Therefore, competition prevents media capture and reduces bias.
To summarize, competition can decrease media bias if consumers value accuracy and
competition makes suppression of information costly for media outlets or the government.
In contrast, media bias may persist in competitive markets when readers or viewers prefer
partisan information, the news events contain unverifiable facts, or media outlets can hire
journalists at a lower wage by granting discretion.
We expect competition would reduce bias in newspaper coverage of scandals for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, the growth of the newspaper market during the time period of this
study, 1870–1910, would make it more costly for newspapers to tolerate bias. Consistent with
this expectation, Petrova (2011) presents evidence that the growth of the advertising market
during the 19th century contributed to the rise of independent media. The author analyzes
the link between potential advertising revenue across U.S. cities and entry and exit of parti-
san and independent newspapers during the 19th century and finds that markets with high
advertising revenues are likely to have independent newspapers. In a similar vein, Gentzkow
(2006) study how U.S. newspapers covered the Cre´dit Mobilier scandal in the early 1870s and
the Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s. The authors note that in the period between these
scandals technological progress in the printing industry, coupled with the contemporaneous
increase in the population and income of U.S. cities, induced an enormous growth in the size
of the newspapers’ market. In the competition for market shares and advertising revenue,
newspapers faced strong incentives to cut the ties with political parties and become (at least
formally) independent. The authors find that the coverage of the Cre´dit Mobilier scandal –
which occurred in a period dominated by partisan newspapers – was more biased than the
coverage of Teapot Dome – which occurred at a time when fewer dailies were directly linked
to political parties.
Second, scandals are verifiable news events.37 Therefore, if a newspaper suppresses infor-
37In contrast, an example of unverifiable news story is “Bill Clinton’s effectiveness as a President.” (Anand,
Di Tella and Galetovic 2007; p.641)
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mation about a scandal in a competitive market, one of its competitors can break the news
and damage the newspaper’s reputation. Also, when newspapers face competition, especially
from a newspaper associated with the opposition party, then they must worry about “spin
control,” and may find themselves devoting a substantial amount of coverage to scandals
– even scandals involving politicians in the party to which they are attached – in order to
respond to especially critical articles published in the opposition party’s newspapers.
While theory can guide us to some degree, the effect of market competition on media bias
is ultimately an empirical question. To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first attempts
to estimate the relationship between competition and media bias directly on a large-scale
basis.38
Data and Measures
This paper studies how the media market structure present in the period 1870-1910 in the
U.S. influenced how and whether partisan newspapers covered political scandals. In order
to do so we put together a dataset with detailed information for 121 political scandals,
including the partisanship of the politician involved and the type of each scandal (fraud,
bribery, corruption, etc.). Additionally, we collected the number of articles about these
scandals published by the 157 newspapers, and included descriptive information not only for
these newspapers, but also for their local competition. What follows is a description of our
data sources and the methods we used to build each part of the dataset.
Scandals
There is no exhaustive list of political scandals for the period we are studying. We therefore
constructed our own list using three sources. The result is a sample of 121 scandals. Ap-
38Puglisi and Snyder (2011) find a negative but statistically insignificant effect of competition on media
bias. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) tests whether competition reduces reporting bias in the market for
security analyst earnings forecasts. They show mergers of brokerage houses are positively correlated with
optimism bias in reporting, which is consistent with the hypothesis that competition reduces bias.
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pendix Table B.1 lists each scandal, including the sources used to identify it. Some of these
scandals involve more than one politician, and some politicians were involved in more than
one scandal. In these cases we treat each politician as a separate observation, as well as each
scandal in which a same politician was involved.
The first source is the combined archives of five of the largest daily newspapers in the
U.S. at the time of study. Specifically, using ProQuest’s archive of articles of the Chicago
Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington
Post, we conducted searches for all articles using a set of search terms that referred to
different political offices (senator, mayor, etc.) as well as a number of offenses and legal
actions that could be taken against them (words such as bribe, corruption, fraud, arrest,
trial, etc.).39 We restricted attention to scandals in which official legal action took place or
which appeared in two or more of the five newspapers.
We chose these five newspapers to help identify scandals based on four criteria. First, all
of them were large and well established newspapers at the time. Second, they were located
in five of the largest cities in the country at the time, where they faced highly competitive
media markets, making them more likely to report scandals from both parties. Third, they
broadly cover all regions of the country – northeast, midwest, south, and west – so even
though each newspaper exhibits a regional bias, most of the country should be well covered
by the five of them combined. Finally, we could collect articles from them using the same
search string and search engine.
We do not include any of the five newspapers used to help identify scandals in our analysis,
since including them could lead to obvious biases. To be even more conservative, we also drop
all newspapers in other “large” markets – defined as markets with at least 10 newspapers –
because the market forces acting on these newspapers might be similar to those acting on
the five newspapers we used to identify scandals.
39The exact string used for this search is (indict* or convict* or guilty or bribe* or corrupt* or scandal
or impeach*) and (congressm?n or senator* or governor* or mayor* or representative*), where * and ? are
wildcards.
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We complemented the ProQuest searches with two other sources. The first is the section
“Politicians in Trouble or Disgrace” on the website Political Graveyard.40 We chose only
scandals involving corruption while in office – most of these scandals overlapped with those
we found by searching the five newspapers. Second, we included all cases of contested
elections in the U.S. Senate in which the reasons given for the contest included accusations
of bribery or fraud in the election process, and where the Senate investigated the claims. The
information is from the Senate Historical Office, which has a section on the Senate’s website
describing each contested election, including information about the politicians involved, a
summary of the case, and the dates at which the contestation process began and ended.
Our list of scandals includes 121 observations. Table 2.1 shows that slightly over 60%
of these involve Republican politicians, which is likely due to the fact that the Republicans
held a majority of government offices during our period of study. The scandals are evenly
distributed between local and state level scandals, and these add up to 93% of the total
observations.
Table 2.1: Scandals by Political Affiliation and by Scope
Panel A: By Political Affiliation
Number Percent
Democratic 45 37.2
Republican 76 62.8
Total 121 100
Panel B: By Geographical Scope
Number Percent
National 8 6.6
State 59 48.8
Local 54 44.6
Total 121 100
40See http://politicalgraveyard.com.
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Newspaper Articles
We measure newspaper coverage by the number of articles published by each newspaper
that mention the scandal while the scandal was ongoing. For each scandal, we define the
relevant time period as follows. The period begins on the first day of the month in which
the scandal began – i.e., an official body opened an investigation, or the politician was
arrested or indicted – and the period ends on the last day of the month during which an
official resolution to the scandal occurred – i.e., the investigation was closed, the politician
was convicted, acquitted, or died. The newspapers in our data set are from the newspaper
archive America’s Historical Newspapers, which contains issues for 157 newspapers for the
period 1870-1910.
To identify the newspaper articles that mention each scandal, we constructed a search
string that included the name and office of the politician involved, plus key words and phrases
drawn from the information gathered when we first identified the scandal from the sources.
Then, we constructed a separate search string tailored to each case. Two examples are
(“senator tweed” or “boss tweed”) and (“tweed ring” or tammany or embezzle* or arrest*
or trial or convict*) for the final scandal involving William Tweed, and (congressman or
representative) and (“star route” or “star-route”) and (indict* or charge* or bribe* or trial*
or guilty or acquit*) for the scandal involving William Pitt Kellogg. Since there are 121 such
strings and some of them fairly long, we do not list them all here.41 To scale the number
of articles, we collected the total number of articles published by the newspaper during the
relevant period of the scandal.42
41A list with the exact search string used for each scandal is available on request. After searching we
checked 2% of the results for all the scandals by hand, to check for false positives; in some cases this led us
to modify our search strings.
42We used PERL scripts to automate the date-collection process.
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Newspaper Media Markets
To describe the market environment facing each of the newspapers in our sample, we collected
information about the newspaper’s partisanship, frequency of publication, and circulation,
as well as the partisanship and circulation of all other newspapers in the same city or town
at that time. We collect this from Rowell’s American Newspaper Directory and N.W. Ayer
& Son’s American Newspaper Annual and Directory. These were annual publications that
together covered the period 1869 to 1922, and contained information about each newspaper
published in every city, including partisanship, frequency of circulation and size of circula-
tion, language of publication, and other information. Since we are mainly interested in the
competition between partisan newspapers, our data set only has information for the newspa-
pers that supported one of the major political parties or declared themselves to be politically
independent or neutral. The independent newspapers constitute a “control group” to which
we compare the Democratic and Republican newspapers.
Table 2.2: Newspapers by Party and by Media Market
Panel A: By Party
Number Percent
Democratic 59 34.7
Republican 82 48.2
Independent 29 17.1
Total 170 100
Panel B: By Media Market
Number Percent
1 30 9.4
2 49 15.3
3 51 15.9
4 56 17.5
5 54 16.9
6 to 10 80 25
Total 320 100
We collected the media market information for all of the newspapers in our sample (from
America’s Historical Newspapers). Table 2.2 has the number of newspapers according to
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partisanship. About half of the newspapers from America’s Historical Newspapers in our
sample were Republican, almost 35% were Democratic, and a little under 20% were Inde-
pendent.43 Panel B in Table 2.2 classifies newspapers according to media market type. Since
there were numerous changes in the number of newspapers in a city, and we count each
change separately, the number of newspapers counted this way is about 320.
Newspaper Variables
The scandals in our dataset overlapped between one to four calendar years and the infor-
mation that we have available on newspapers and the media market corresponds to those
calendar years. In some cases, newspapers changed partisan affiliations during the course of
a scandal. In other cases, the media market structure facing a newspaper changed during
the course of a scandal. Since we study each scandal as a unit and in order to define each
newspaper’s partisan affiliation and market environment for each scandal, we averaged over
the calendar years during which the scandal took place.
More specifically, we define a newspaper as Republican during a scandal if Rowells/Ayers
classified the newspaper as Republican for more than half of the time during the scandal
period. Similarly, we define a newspaper as Democratic during a scandal if Rowells/Ayers
classified it as Democratic for more than half of the time during the scandal period, and we
define a newspaper as Independent if Rowells/Ayers classified it as Independent for more
than half of the time.
As discussed above, one reasonable hypothesis is that a newspaper will be most biased
in a monopoly situation, where it does not face any competition in its city, and that this
bias will decrease as the number of newspapers in the city increases. We use the log of the
total number of newspapers in the city to capture this effect. This is a convenient way to
measure the effect of increased competition, since it is likely that the effect of an additional
newspaper is stronger when this increases the number of newspapers in a market from 1 to 2,
43If a newspaper changed partisanship it appears multiple times, once for each partisan affiliation.
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or 2 to 3, than when it increases the number of newspapers from 9 to 10. In some cases the
number of competitors in a given newspaper’s market changed over the course of a scandal.
Therefore, for each scandal and newspaper we define Log Newspapers as the average number
of newspapers circulating in the newspaper’s town over the course of the scandal.
The dependent variable is Relative Hits ij, defined as the number of articles published by
newspaper j about scandal i (hij), divided by the total number of articles published by this
newspaper during the period of scandal i (Hij), minus the average number of this ratio for
all the newspapers that published articles about scandal i:
Relative Hits ij =
hij
Hij
−
∑ni
k=1(hik/Hik)
ni
(4)
where ni is the number of newspapers in the sample during the period of scandal i. That is,
we study how a newspaper’s coverage deviates from the average coverage of the scandal, as a
result of the type of scandal and the partisanship of both the newspaper and the politicians
involved in the scandals. Since the mean of hij/Hij is only .000267, or 2.67 articles per
10,000, we rescale Relative Hits by multiplying by 10,000.
Bias in the coverage of scandals can be in two directions. A newspaper can choose to “over
cover” scandals involving politicians of the opposition party (reminding readers as much as
possible that the politicians in the opposition party are corrupt, dishonest, untrustworthy,
and generally not deserving of their votes). A newspaper can also choose to “under cover”
scandals involving politicians from its own party (possibly hoping that readers might not
learn about the scandal, or at least trying to limit the damage to the party’s reputation
by not reminding readers about the scandal). To capture the first of these, we define the
variable Opposition Party ij; this variable is equal to 1 if newspaper j and the politician
involved in scandal i belong to different parties, and it is 0 if they are attached to the same
party or the newspaper is independent. To capture the second type of bias, we define the
variable Own Party ij; this variable is equal to 1 if newspaper j and the politician in scandal
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i are both affiliated with the same political party, and it is 0 otherwise or if the newspaper is
independent. Finally, putting the two types of bias together produces a measure of the overall
bias of the newspaper, i.e., how much it “over covers” scandals related to the opposition party
and “under covers” scandals related to its own party. To capture this, we define the variable
Overall Bias ij = Opposition Party ij − Own Party ij; so, Overall Bias ij is equal to -1 when
both scandal and newspaper are affiliated with the same political party, it is equal to +1
when they belong to opposite parties, and it is 0 otherwise.
It is reasonable to expect that newspapers will give more coverage to scandals that occur
within their state or in the nearby states, while scandals that pertain to politicians in offices
at the federal level will receive different treatment. In order to account for this difference in
treatment, we created three different variables: In State is a dummy variable that is equal to
one if the politician involved in scandal i works in the state where newspaper j is published;
In Region is a dummy variable that equals one if the politician involved in scandal i is from
a state that shares boundaries with the state where newspaper j is located; and National is
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the scandal involves a politician that occupies an
office at the federal level.44
Newspapers also vary considerably in size, circulation, frequency of circulation, etc. To
capture some of this variation we control for Newspaper Frequency , defined as 7 for daily
newspapers, 3 for tri-weeklies, 2 for semi-weeklies and 1 for weeklies.
Other Data
We also include a variety of demographic and socio-economic variables, measured at the
county level. These help control for factors such as the income, urbanization, and literacy of
each newspaper in our sample. More specifically, we extract the following variables from the
U.S. census files at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR
44We also constructed InCounty, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the politician involved in
scandal i works in the county where newspaper j is published. This variable turns out to be zero for all but
a tiny number of cases, and due to perfect multicollinearity is dropped it from the analysis.
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Study 2896 by Haines 2006): total population, the number of white population, the number
of male population aged 21 and older, the number of people living in towns with 2,500 or
more residents, the number of people living in towns with 25,000 or more residents, the total
dollar value of manufacturing output, the number of people employed in manufacturing,
and the total annual wages in manufacturing. We linearly interpolate each number between
census years.45 We use these variables to construct the share of white population, the share
of males aged 21 and older, the share of the population living in towns with 2,500 or more
people, the share of population living in cities with 25,000 or more people, the total dollar
value of manufacturing output per-capita, and the average wage in manufacturing.46
Finally, in some specifications we also control for the partisanship of each newspapers’ mar-
ket area, using the Democratic vote share for president in the county of each newspaper in the
most recent election prior to the scandal. Define the variable Voter Partisanship, as follows.
Let Dij be the Democratic share of the vote in the county where newspaper j is published,
in the presidential election immediately prior to scandal j. Then Voter Partisanshipij = Dij
if scandal j involves a Republican politician, and Voter Partisanshipij = 1 −Dij if scandal
j involves a Democratic politician. Thus, Voter Partisanship is defined so that if voters are
“cognitive dissonance avoiders” and newspapers published articles cater to this taste, then
the relationship between Relative Hits and Voter Partisanship will be positive.47
Appendix Table B.2 contains summary statistics of all variables used in our main analysis.
45The number of males aged 21 and older, the total dollar value of manufacturing output, the number of
people employed in manufacturing, and the total annual wages in manufacturing are missing for the year
1910. We use the average of the 1900 and 1920 values for the year 1910 before interpolating these measures.
46All dollar values are in 1910 dollars.
47Note that since newspaper markets are mainly towns or cities rather than whole counties, we would
prefer to measure the demographic, socio-economic, and political variables at the town level rather than
the county level. Unfortunately, these do not exist for our period of study, and constructing such measures
would be an enormous if not impossible task.
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Results
We estimate models of the following form:
Relative Hits ij = β0 + β1 Opposition Party ij + β2 Log Newspapers ij + γ′Xij + ij (5)
and
Relative Hits ij = β0 + β1 Opposition Party ij + β2 Log Newspapers ij +
β3 Opposition Party ij×Log Newspapers ij + γ′Xij + ij (6)
where Opposition Party and Log Newspapers are as described above, and Xij is a vector of
control variables. The models are similar for the other bias measures, with Own Party or
Overall Bias substituted for Opposition Party .48
The first model gives a basic sense of the relationships between newspaper coverage of
scandals and key variables presumed to affect this coverage. It also provides a baseline esti-
mate of the average direction and magnitude of the bias in scandal coverage after controlling
for some of these key variables, given by β1. Given the discussion above, we expect that
β1>0 for Opposition Party and Overall Bias , and we expect that β1<0 for Own Party .
The second model contains the main parameter of interest, β3, which provides an estimate
of how newspaper competition affects the bias in scandal coverage. If β1> 0 and β3< 0, or
β1<0 and β3>0, then an increase in the number of newspapers is associated with a decline
in the average amount of bias.
The vector of controls always includes scandal-specific fixed effects, In State, In Region,
48We do not run models with newspaper-specific fixed-effects, because we do not yet have enough within-
newspaper variation in the key interaction variables. Identifying the coefficient on Opposition Party ×
Log Newspapers requires newspapers that had an opportunity to cover different types of scandals (some
involving the opposition party and some not) under noticeably different competitive situations. In our sam-
ple there are only a few such newspapers – e.g., there are only 15 newspapers that had the opportunity to
cover both opposition and other scandals while in a monopoly or duopoly situation, and had the opportunity
to cover both opposition and other scandals while facing two or more competitors.
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and Newspaper Frequency. In some specifications the vector of controls also includes the
county-level demographic and socioeconomic described in the previous section, as well as a
time trend. In other specifications, the vector of controls also includes the control for voter
partisanship.49
Baseline Estimates
Table 2.3 presents our “baseline” results. Columns 1-4 of the table show the estimates for
the Opposition Party bias variable, columns 5-8 show the estimates for the OwnParty bias
variable, and columns 9-12 show the estimates for the Overall Bias variable. We include
scandal specific fixed effects in all specifications. In the odd numbered columns, the ad-
ditional controls are those shown in the table. In the even numbered columns, all of the
additional demographic and socio-economic controls are included, as well as a time trend.50
Standard errors, clustered by scandal, are in parentheses.
Note first that by themselves the estimated coefficients on the bias variables are always sta-
tistically significant, substantively meaningful, and in the expected direction. Partisan news-
papers publish more articles about scandals involving politicians from the opposition party,
and they print fewer articles about scandals involving politicians from their own party, rel-
ative to independent newspapers. Consider, for example the coefficient on Opposition Party
in column 2, which is 0.863. Recall that Relative Hits is measured in hits per 10,000 arti-
cles, and the average number of articles per scandal in our sample is 2.74 per 10,000. The
point estimate therefore implies that, on average, partisan newspapers publish about 31%
(100×0.863/2.74) more stories about a scandal when it involves an opposition party politician.
Another way to view the size of the coefficient is to note that Relative Hits standard devia-
tion of 5.35, so the difference between a newspaper-scandal pair with Opposition Party = 1
and a pair with Opposition Party =0 is about 16% of a standard deviation in Relative Hits .
49The variable National is never significant in any of the basic specifications, so we drop this variable.
50The estimates for these variables are not shown, but are available on request.
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Table 2.3: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Newspaper Frequency 0.372 0.243 0.287 0.215 0.405 0.298 0.391 0.301 0.387 0.273 0.345 0.260
(0.202) (0.215) (0.223) (0.225) (0.202) (0.210) (0.217) (0.217) (0.201) (0.212) (0.219) (0.221)
In-State Scandal 4.747 4.773 4.760 4.800 4.767 4.811 4.743 4.806 4.747 4.785 4.744 4.799
(1.429) (1.434) (1.435) (1.437) (1.423) (1.426) (1.439) (1.441) (1.426) (1.429) (1.438) (1.439)
In-Region Scandal 1.989 1.914 1.973 1.910 1.992 1.919 1.996 1.911 1.999 1.924 1.994 1.917
(0.670) (0.667) (0.674) (0.667) (0.669) (0.668) (0.674) (0.670) (0.671) (0.668) (0.676) (0.670)
Log Newspapers 0.472 0.366 -0.310 -0.479 -0.005 -0.083
(0.208) (0.209) (0.196) (0.208) (0.153) (0.159)
Opposition Party 0.859 0.863 2.462 2.396
(0.273) (0.272) (0.742) (0.759)
Opposition Party × -1.200 -1.133
Log Newspapers (0.400) (0.410)
Own Party -0.633 -0.689 -1.753 -2.085
(0.254) (0.260) (0.635) (0.676)
Own Party × 0.864 1.061
Log Newspapers (0.342) (0.369)
Overall Bias 0.440 0.450 1.266 1.282
(0.151) (0.151) (0.399) (0.399)
Overall Bias × -0.627 -0.630
Log Newspapers (0.214) (0.215)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
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Figure 2.1: Newspaper Bias vs. Number of Competing Newspapers
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More interestingly, columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12 show that newspapers are significantly
more biased when they face less competition from other newspapers. This holds for all three
bias measures, and the estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level. In all cases,
the point estimates indicated clear differences in bias between newspapers that face little or
no competition and those that compete with many other newspapers. Consider again the
Opposition Party bias measure, and focus now on column 3. The coefficients imply that if a
newspaper has a monopoly (Log Newspapers =0), then it will publish 2.462 more articles per
10,000 when a scandal involves a politician of the opposite party than when the scandal does
not. Since the average number of articles per scandal in our sample is 2.74 per 10,000, this
represents an amount of coverage that is 90% above the average amount (100×2.462/2.74).
By contrast, if a newspaper faces four competitors (so Log Newspapers = Log(5) = 1.609),
then it will only publish 1.291 more articles per 10,000 when a scandal involves a politician
of the opposite party than when the scandal does not (2.462 − 1.2×1.609 + .472×1.609).
Thus, in relative terms, the degree of bias is only 52% as large when a newspaper faces four
competitors than when it faces none.
Figure 2.1 shows the predicted relationships between the three different types of bias and
the number of newspapers, based on the point estimates from columns 3, 7 and 11 (and
setting the relevant bias variable at 1). For example, moving from 1 to 4 to 9 newspapers,
the Overall Bias falls from 1.266 to 0.39 to -.123.
Adding Voter Partisanship
Table 2.4 shows the results when we estimate the same models reported in Table 2.3, but
also include a control for the underlying partisanship of voters in each newspaper’s county,
Voter Partisanship.51
51The number of observations in Table 2.4 is smaller than the number of observations in Table 2.3, because
when we add Voter Partisanship the newspapers published in U.S. territories and the District of Columbia
are dropped.
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Table 2.4: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Newspaper Frequency 0.201 0.171 0.207 0.155 0.129 0.184 0.178 0.196 0.160 0.179 0.190 0.176
(0.216) (0.233) (0.233) (0.236) (0.219) (0.231) (0.232) (0.231) (0.217) (0.232) (0.232) (0.233)
In-State Scandal 4.789 4.853 4.830 4.888 4.801 4.895 4.859 4.923 4.787 4.869 4.842 4.903
(1.438) (1.444) (1.442) (1.446) (1.429) (1.429) (1.440) (1.442) (1.433) (1.436) (1.441) (1.443)
In-Region Scandal 1.865 1.793 1.862 1.785 1.861 1.802 1.855 1.784 1.867 1.803 1.861 1.789
(0.667) (0.656) (0.668) (0.656) (0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.656) (0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.657)
Log Newspapers 0.403 0.339 -0.882 -0.849 -0.234 -0.243
(0.242) (0.261) (0.276) (0.276) (0.167) (0.191)
Opposition Party 0.997 1.030 2.863 2.893
(0.328) (0.327) (0.879) (0.881)
Opposition Party × -1.319 -1.311
Log Newspapers (0.450) (0.454)
Own Party -0.896 -0.889 -2.897 -2.865
(0.315) (0.316) (0.883) (0.875)
Own Party × 1.403 1.401
Log Newspapers (0.450) (0.450)
Overall Bias 0.559 0.560 1.558 1.549
(0.186) (0.183) (0.471) (0.468)
Overall Bias × -0.720 -0.715
Log Newspapers (0.237) (0.237)
Voter Partisanship -1.094 -1.024 -1.406 -1.344 -1.019 -0.884 -1.402 -1.244 -1.262 -1.145 -1.571 -1.447
(0.866) (0.843) (0.875) (0.857) (0.869) (0.845) (0.902) (0.879) (0.902) (0.876) (0.923) (0.900)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
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As Table 2.4 shows, when we add Voter Partisanship, the point estimates for the bias
variables tend to increase in magnitude relative to those in Table 2.3, and remain statistically
significant at the .05 level. This is true for the simple bias variables – Opposition Party ,
Own Party , and Overall Bias – and it is also true for the coefficients of interest – Opposition
Party×Log Newspapers , Own Party×Log Newspapers , and Overall Bias×Log Newspapers .
Perhaps surprisingly, in all columns the estimated coefficient on Voter Partisanship is
negative rather than positive; however, it is never statistically significant.52
In any case, the bottom line is that including Voter Partisanship does not weaken the
estimated relationship between competition and newspaper bias.
Adding Time Trends in Bias
Table 2.5 shows the results when we estimate the same models reported in Table 2.3, but
also include linear time trends in the bias terms. That is, in the regressions focusing on
bias against the opposition party, we include the variable Opposition Party×Y ear, in the
regressions focusing on bias in favor of one’s own party we include Own Party×Y ear, and
in the regressions focusing on overall bias we include Overall Bias×Y ear. This allows the
specifications to incorporate other forces that might have been reducing (or increasing) bias
nationwide, such as changing professional norms in journalism, and the general increase in
advertising as a source of newspaper revenue.
As Table 2.5 shows, when we add the new variables the estimated coefficients on the main
variables of interest – are similar to those in Table 2.3, and always statistically significant at
the .05 levels.
Interestingly, the estimates on the time trend variables all suggest that the level of news-
paper bias has declined over time, and all are statistically significant at the .05 or .10 level.
The trends are relatively large, also. For example, the coefficients in column 5 suggest that
52One possible reason for the insignificant estimates is measurement error, since the Voter Partisanship
variable is measured at the county level rather than the town level.
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Table 2.5: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Newspapers 0.376 0.296 -0.248 -0.416 -0.013 -0.076
(0.196) (0.202) (0.183) (0.196) (0.154) (0.158)
Opposition Party 2.266 2.191
(0.686) (0.699)
Opposition Party × -1.002 -0.931
Log Newspapers (0.357) (0.367)
Own Party -1.578 -1.913
(0.575) (0.620)
Own Party × 0.707 0.905
Log Newspapers (0.308) (0.338)
Overall Bias 1.158 1.173
(0.365) (0.366)
Overall Bias × -0.531 -0.532
Log Newspapers (0.192) (0.194)
Year -0.007 -0.005 -0.033 -0.034 -0.025 -0.024
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Opposition Party × Year -0.041 -0.041
(0.018) (0.018)
Own Party × Year 0.030 0.030
(0.017) (0.017)
Overall Bias × Year -0.020 -0.020
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
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between 1870 and 1910 the average Overall Bias fell by 97% (from 1.856 to 0.056). This is
consistent with previous findings, such as Gentzkow et al. (2006) and Petrova (2011).
Bias in Coverage During Election Periods
We also conducted analyses focusing on newspaper coverage during election periods. More
specifically, for each scandal we identified the closest election that was held during or after
the scandal, and counted the number of articles about the scandal printed in each newspaper
during the two months leading up to election day. We then estimated the same models as
in Table 2.3 with the election-period coverage dependent variable.
Qualitatively, the pattern of estimates when we focus on election-period coverage is quite
similar to that in Table 2.3. The magnitudes are smaller than those in Table 2.3, because the
standard deviation of the dependent variable is much smaller.53 For example, the estimated
coefficient on Opposition Party in Equation 2 is 0.139, and the estimated standard error is
0.070. The estimated coefficient on Opposition Party in Equation 3 is 0.450 (standard error
= 0.214), the estimated coefficient on Log Newspapers is 0.073 (standard error = 0.042), and
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term Opposition Party×Log Newspapers is -0.232
(standard error = 0.109). Thus, as in the baseline specifications, the estimates indicate that
newspapers exhibit bias in their election-period scandal coverage, but the size of the bias
falls as competition increases.
Conclusion
Much of the U.S. press in the 19th and early 20th centuries was highly partisan. The analysis
above indicates that this partisan bias was reflected in the amount of coverage devoted to
scandals depending on the partisan affiliations of the politicians involved. Partisan news-
papers tended to cover scandals involving the opposition party’s politicians more intensely,
53In the interest of space we do not report the estimates in detail in yet another table. They are available
upon request.
51
and they also tended to cover scandals involving their own party’s politicians more lightly.
Perhaps more importantly, it appears that competition – measured simply as the num-
ber of competing newspapers – reduced the degree to which partisan newspapers skewed
their coverage of scandals. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a
monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors would on average exhibits less than
50% as much bias in coverage intensity (using the overall bias measure), and a newspaper
facing six competitors would exhibit no noticeable bias.
Our sample contains 157 newspapers. This is large enough to give us enough observations
to have confidence in our regression estimates; also, we have no reason to believe that the
sample is unrepresentative in ways that might bias our estimates. Nonetheless, the sample
only represents a small fraction – about 2% – of the newspapers that circulated in the U.S.
during the period of study. Enlarging the sample is crucial, especially in order to estimate
models with newspaper-specific fixed effects.
It would be especially interesting to extend the time period covered, through the 1910s
and into the 1920s. This would allow us to study whether newspapers responded to the
structural changes in political institutions that began at the start of the 20th century –
such as the introduction of primary elections, the direct election of U.S. Senators, and the
shift toward non-partisan elections for local offices. One prediction is that under the direct
primary, even highly partisan voters should be interested in learning about the malfeasance
of state and local politicians in their own party, since they can vote against these politicians
in the primary election. Did newspapers respond to this demand?
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Chapter 3. Newspaper Coverage and the Effect of Scan-
dals in Congressional Elections
Do voters punish politicians implicated in scandals? Previous studies show that politicians in
scandals suffer only moderately in elections (e.g., Peters and Welch 1980; Welch and Hibbing
1997; Brown 2006; Basinger 2013). Given that voters typically have only a limited amount
of knowledge about politics (e.g., Carpini and Keeter 1997), politicians in scandals may be
able to get by with their wrongdoings due to voters’ ignorance. If voters’ ability to punish
politicians in scandals depends on voters’ information, scandals would be more costly to
politicians when the media cover them.
In this paper, I study whether newspaper coverage of scandals can help voters punish the
party of politicians involved in a scandal in the context of the U.S. House of Representatives
from 1982 to 2004. To investigate the effect of press coverage, I use the congruence between
newspaper markets and congressional districts following Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010). I
first present evidence that newspapers write more stories about representatives involved in
a scandal in more congruent districts. Subsequently I show that parties with candidates or
previous incumbents involved in a scandal suffer moderately in elections, which is consistent
with previous studies. More importantly, I find that the parties involved in scandals do
worse in districts/counties with higher congruence: they get fewer votes and are less likely
to win.
Previous Literature
Previous studies show that scandals hurt U.S. House incumbents, especially in general elec-
tions. Scholars have been using various sources to identify scandals and find that incumbents
involved in a scandal lose about 6 to 12 percent of votes in general elections (e.g., Peters
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and Welch 1980; Abramowitz 1991; Welch and Hibbing 1997; Herrick 2000; Brown 2006).54
A series of studies also investigated the effect of the House Bank scandal, which broke in
1992 when it was revealed that representatives had been overdrawing their House checking
accounts without any penalty. While some scholars find that the scandal contributed signif-
icantly to the turnover in the House (e.g., Banducci and Karp 1994; Jacobson and Dimock
1994), others conclude that its effect on retirements of implicated House members was not
significant (e.g., Alford et al. 1994; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994).
Three recent studies compiled the list of scandals over the long period of time and analyzed
how scandals hurt politicians. Hirano and Snyder (2012) analyze House incumbents involved
in a scandal between 1978 and 2008. They find that incumbents in scandals receive 16
percent less votes in primary elections, 11 percent more likely to lose primary, receive 11
percent less votes in general elections, and 20 percent more likely to lose general elections.
Basinger (2013) analyzes scandals involving members of House of Representatives in the
post-Watergate era, from 1972 to 2012. He finds that incumbents involved in a scandal
receive about 4 to 5 percent less votes in general elections. Finally, Praino, Stockemer and
Moscardelli (2013) find that House incumbents accused of unethical behavior by the House
Ethics Committee between 1972 and 2006 received 12 percent less votes in general elections.
They also show that it takes years for incumbents in scandals recover their previous levels
of electoral support.
As these studies demonstrate, scandal is clearly a bad news for politicians. However, it
is far from a political death sentence. Although scandals hurt incumbents in elections, the
majority of them still survive their scandals (e.g., Peters and Welch 1980; Welch and Hibbing
1997; Brown 2006; Basinger 2013). How do politicians in scandals continue to get support
from voters?
One explanation is that voters may support politicians in scandals because they weigh
corruption charges with other considerations such as partisanship or policy stance of can-
54For survey of the literature, see Basinger (2013).
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didates. Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977) present evidence from an experiment which
suggests that voters implicitly “trade” a possibility of corruption for their preferred policy.
Similarly, Eggers (2014) claims that voters with strong partisan attachments are less respon-
sive to corruption charges of politicians. He analyzes the 2009 UK expenses scandal, which
involves members of parliaments who misused public money, and shows that incumbents
implicated in the expenses scandal were punished less severely in constituencies where the
partisan stakes were higher.
Another possibility is that voters are simply ignorant about scandals. Consistent with
this explanation, Klasˇnja (2014) finds that voters with low levels of political knowledge tend
to vote for incumbent House members charged with corruption.
In this paper, I focus on the role of the media. If politicians implicated in scandals
get reelected mainly because of voters’ ignorance, media coverage of scandals will make
it more difficult for politicians in scandals to secure their office. Previous studies show
that the media can affect public policy and improve political accountability by providing
political information to voters (e.g., Besley and Burgess 2002; Stro¨mberg 2004b; Snyder and
Stro¨mberg 2010; Dyck, Moss and Zingales 2013; Fergusson 2014; Lim, Snyder and Stro¨mberg
2015). Moreover, studies on other countries suggest politicians suspected of wrongdoings are
punished by voters when the media cover them (e.g., Chang, Golden and Hill 2010 on Italy,
Costas-Pe´rez, Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro 2012 on Spain, and Larreguy, Marshall and
Snyder 2015 on Mexico).
While the literature on the effect of scandals in the U.S. Congress empirically examine
factors that could mediate the effects of scandals, such as the type of scandals (Doherty,
Dowling and Miller 2011), the passage of time (Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2014), challenger
quality (Basinger 2013), and voters’ political knowledge (Klasˇnja 2014), they paid little
attention to the role of the media. This paper contributes to this literature by highlighting
the importance of newspaper coverage in punishing members of U.S. Congress for their
misdemeanors.
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Measurement and Data
Congruence
To study the effect of newspaper coverage of scandals on voters, I use the degree of congruence
between newspaper markets and congressional districts, suggested by Snyder and Stro¨mberg
(2010). Following Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010), Lim and Snyder (2015), and Lim, Snyder
and Stro¨mberg (2015), I assume a simple linear relationship between the number of stories
that newspaper m writes about congressional district d, qmd, and the share of newspaper
m’s readers living in district d, ReaderSharemd,
qmd = α0 + α1 ×ReaderSharemd, (7)
where α1 > 0. Since more than one newspapers circulate in a typical congressional district,
I consider the average ReaderSharemd weighted by the market shares of newspapers in d,
Congruenced =
M∑
m=1
MarketSharemdReaderSharemd, (8)
where M is the number of newspapers that circulate in d.
The sales-weighted average number of articles, qd, about congressional district d is
qd =
M∑
m=1
MarketSharemd qmd
= α0 + α1Congruenced.
(9)
Therefore, I can use Congruenced as a measure of newspaper coverage of congressional
districts.
Similarly, I use the county level congruence measure as a proxy for the sales-weighted
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average number of articles about district d in county c with M newspapers,
qcd =
M∑
m=1
MarketSharemc qmd
= α0 + α1Congruencecd,
(10)
where,
Congruencecd =
M∑
m=1
MarketSharemcReaderSharemd. (11)
Newspaper circulation data to measure Congruence is from Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010).
They use newspaper circulation data for the years 1982 and 1991–2004 from the Audit Bureau
of Circulation (ABC), which collects data on each newspaper’s circulation in each county
for nearly all newspapers in the US. They complemented this data with county-circulation
data, provided by Standard Rate and Date Service, for non-ABC newspapers for 1991 and
2004, and interpolated values between these two years.
Scandal
The list of scandals is from Hirano and Snyder (2012) and Basinger et al. (2014). Hirano
and Snyder (2012) collected scandals from the Historical Summary of Conduct Cases in the
House of Representatives (2004) published after each Congress by the House Committee
on Standards of Official Conduct, the Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations
of the Public Integrity Section published annually by the US Department of Justice, and
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports. Basinger et al. (2014) collected scandals using
Congressional Quarterly Almanac (annually from 1972 to the present), newspaper archives,
and previous scholarly works (see Basinger et al. 2014; p.28).
From these two lists, I identified 214 scandals for the years 1982–2004. Among these
scandals, 160 are included in the analyses (158 in the district sample, and 85 in the county
sample. The list of scandals is reported in Appendix Table C.1.
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Newspaper Coverage of Scandals
In this section, I show that newspaper coverage of a representative involved in a scandal is
increasing in the share of readers who live in the congressional district.
Newspaper coverage data is from Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010). The data contains the
coverage of representatives from 1991 to 2002 in 161 newspapers (142 newspapers from
NewsLibrary.com, 8 newspapers from Lexis/Nexis, and 11 newspapers from their individual
website). To construct the measure of newspaper coverage of representatives, qmdt, they
count the number of articles in newspaper m during Congress t that contain the name of
the representative from district d and the word “Congress.” The resulting sample consists
of 4,206 newspaper-district-years.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics (Newspaper Coverage)
Newspaper Level
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Articles about representative 101.233 97.011 0 1454 4206
ReaderShare 0.165 0.221 0 1 4206
Scandal 0.033 0.178 0 1 4206
District Level
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Articles about representative
(circulation weighted average) 126.436 103.675 0 1454 2308
Congruence 0.219 0.227 0 1 2308
Scandal 0.038 0.190 0 1 2308
County Level
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Articles about representative
(circulation weighted average) 85.767 94.916 0 1062 3421
Congruence 0.151 0.229 0 1 3421
Scandal 0.032 0.176 0 1 3421
To examine the relationship between Congruence and newspaper coverage, I also use the
circulation-weighted average number of articles for the congressional districts and congres-
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sional district by county, qd in equation (9) and qcd in equation (10) respectively. Table 3.1
presents summary statistics.
In the sample, 138 newspapers have at least one representatives involved in a scandal
(about 3.3 percent of the sample). I first investigate how newspaper coverage of scandals
is related to ReaderShare (or Congruence) by restricting the sample to newspapers with
representatives involved in scandals. Table 3.2 presents the results from regression analy-
sis of the number of articles on representatives involved in scandals on ReaderShare (or
Congruence). All the regressions in the table contain a set of control variables that may af-
fect the amount of newspaper coverage of representatives: dummy variables for party leaders
(the Speaker of the House, majority leader, majority whip, and minority whip), freshmen,
majority party status, out-of-state districts, whether the representative sought for higher
office (governor or senator) or received a higher appointment, the fraction of people living
in urban areas, the median income, and year fixed effects.
Table 3.2: Newspaper Coverage of Scandals, 1991–
2000
Dep Var = Num of Articles about
Representatives Involved in Scandal
(1) (2) (3)
ReaderShare 409.933
(108.533)
Congruence 398.089 601.422
(124.738) (150.253)
Observations 138 87 109
R2 0.509 0.535 0.572
The units of observation in column (1) is a newspaper by
congress; in column (2) it is a district by congress; and
in column (3) it is district-county by congress. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered by newspaper in column
(1), by district in column (2), and by district-county in
column (3). Year fixed effects and control variables are
included in all regressions.
As column (1) shows, there is a strong and positive relationship between ReaderShare and
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newspaper coverage of representatives involved in a scandal. An increase in ReaderShare
from 0 to 1 leads to about 410 more newspaper articles on the representative. The results
are similar when I use the circulation-weighted average number of articles. An increase in
Congruence from 0 to 1 is associated with 398 more articles in column (2) and 601 more
articles in column (3). According to the estimates, a one standard deviation increase in
ReaderShare (or Congruence) leads to 91, 90, 138 more articles on the representative.
Table 3.3: Newspaper Coverage of Representatives, 1991–2000
Dep Var = Num of Articles about Representatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scandal 46.786 52.981 27.089 11.677 13.176 -19.020
(16.888) (23.403) (14.883) (18.049) (27.283) (14.486)
ReaderShare 164.758 160.235
(16.929) (16.585)
ReaderShare × Scandal 256.566
(118.903)
Congruence 172.402 171.114 167.830 166.068
(20.637) (11.559) (20.424) (11.000)
Congruence × Scandal 229.997 409.209
(137.200) (149.159)
Observations 4206 2308 3421 4206 2308 3421
R2 0.270 0.255 0.282 0.276 0.260 0.294
The units of observation in columns (1) and (4) is a newspaper by congress; in columns (2) and (5) it is
a district by congress; and in columns (3) and (6) it is district-county by congress. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by newspaper in columns (1) and (4), by district in columns (2) and (5), and by
district-county in column (3) and (6). Year fixed effects and control variables are included in all regressions.
Table 3.3 shows the results from regression analyses using the full sample. As shown in
columns (1)–(3), representatives who are involved in scandals receive more attention from
the newspapers. More interestingly, the relationship between Congruence (or ReaderShare)
and the number of articles is greater when the representative is involved in a scandal: the
coefficients of ReaderShare× Scandal and Congruence× Scandal are positive and statis-
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tically significant (except in column (5) where it is only marginally significant). According
to the estimate in column (4), if a representative is not involved in a scandal, an increase in
ReaderShare from 0 to 1 is associated with 160 more articles on the representative. If there
is a representative involved in a scandal, however, an increase in ReaderShare from 0 to 1
leads to 417 more articles on the representative.
This result is consistent with Puglisi and Snyder (2008). They analyze newspaper coverage
of superintendents and find that a decline in test scores55 receives more attention especially in
states with elected superintendents and during the general elections campaign. According to
their reasoning, bad news get more attention because newsworthy figures such as incumbents’
opponents or interest groups dissatisfied with the incumbents reproduce the news during the
campaign. Similarly, when there is a scandal, news are reproduced by opponents or interest
groups that disapprove the representative involved in a scandal, and thus the difference in
the number of articles about the representative between high/low-congruence districts is
magnified.
In summary, the results in this section suggest that newspapers write more stories about
representatives in districts with greater share of their readers especially when representatives
are involved in scandals.
Newspaper Coverage and the Effect of Scandals
In this section, I investigate how the effect of scandals depends on newspaper coverage. I
first present the results from district level analyses.
In the district sample, there are 158 politicians implicated in a scandal.56 Among them,
107 won the election (3 ran unopposed), 18 resigned or retired, 4 lost nominations, and 29
ran in the election and lost. The parties who had a candidate or an incumbent involved in a
55They consider three main nationwide standardized tests: the National Association of Educational
Progress tests, and the SAT and ACT scores.
56The elections immediately following redistricting are excluded except at-large districts – 1982, 1992,
2002, and Texas in 2004.
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scandal suffered only moderately: they lost about 19.6 percent of the time (31 out of 158).
However, the party with a candidate involved in a scandal does worse in districts where
newspapers write more stories about the candidate.
Table 3.4 shows the election results of the parties in scandal. The rows are the percentiles
of Congruence and the columns are the election results of the party involved in a scandal.
In the districts with low congruence (< 25th percentile), the parties involved in scandals
won 87.8 percent of the time. In contrast, in the districts with high congruence (> 75th
percentile), the parties involved in scandals won only 68.3 percent of the time.
Table 3.4: Congruence and Winning Percent
of Party in Scandal
Congruence Lost Won Total
< 25th Percentile 5 36 41
(12.2) (87.8) (100)
25th – 50th Percentile 4 40 44
(9.1) (90.9) (100)
50th – 75th Percentile 9 23 32
(28.1) (71.9) (100)
> 75 Percentile 13 28 41
(31.7) (68.3) (100)
Row percentages are in parentheses. Percentiles are cal-
culated using the whole district sample.
The party involved in a scandal also received fewer votes in high congruence districts.
The average two-party vote share of the party involved in a scandal is about 63.3 percent in
low congruence districts (< 25th percentile) and 55.4 percent in high congruence districts (>
75th percentile). The correlation between the two-party vote share and congruence is −0.3.
To make this point clear, I estimate the following model:
ydt = αd + θt + β1 Scandaldt + β2Congruencedt
β3Congruencedt × Scandaldt + δ′Xdt + dt, (12)
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where ydt is either the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote or an indicator variable
for a Democrat winning in district d in election year t, Scandaldt is 1 (−1) if a Democratic
(Republican) incumbent or candidate is involved in a scandal between the election year t−1
and t and 0 otherwise, αd is a district fixed effect, and θt is a year fixed effect. Xdt is a
vector of district level control variables: the percent urban, log population density, the log
median income, the percentage of, respectively, people aged 65 or older, military population,
people employed in farming, foreign born, and blue-collar workers (see Table 3.5 for summary
statistics).
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics
District Data
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Democratic vote pct 51.890 18.251 7.865 97.077 3187
Democrat win (dummy) 0.530 0.499 0.000 1.000 3745
Incumbent 0.079 0.946 -1.000 1.000 3745
Scandal 0.004 0.205 -1.000 1.000 3745
Congruence 0.451 0.238 0.002 0.963 3745
County Data
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Democratic vote pct (House) 47.640 18.912 0.000 100.000 16171
Democratic vote pct (Pres) 41.073 12.197 0.000 98.407 16171
Incumbent -0.109 0.945 -1.000 1.000 16171
Scandal 0.002 0.204 -1.000 1.000 16171
Congruence 0.502 0.301 0.000 1.000 16171
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Table 3.6: Newspaper Market and the Effect of Scandal: District
Dep Var = Democratic Vote Pct Dep Var = Democratic Win Prob
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incumbent 12.369 11.015 12.342 11.051 0.371 0.350 0.371 0.351
(0.443) (0.409) (0.444) (0.410) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Scandal -2.396 -2.569 1.799 1.155 -0.022 -0.022 0.102 0.104
(0.913) (0.792) (2.112) (1.661) (0.031) (0.031) (0.060) (0.058)
Congruence -5.219 2.499 -0.126 -0.004
(3.360) (2.734) (0.049) (0.052)
Congruence × Scandal -9.358 -8.338 -0.280 -0.283
(3.617) (2.958) (0.121) (0.117)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3187 3187 3187 3187 3745 3745 3745 3745
R2 0.854 0.878 0.855 0.879 0.841 0.848 0.843 0.849
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district. Year and district fixed effects included in all regressions.
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Table 3.6 presents the results. Consistent with previous studies, column (1) and (2) show
that scandals hurt the party: if Democratic or Republican party has an incumbent or a
candidate involved in a scandal, they lose about 2.4 to 2.6 percent of votes. The coefficient
of Scandal is negative when I regress a Democrat wins indicator variable on Scandal, as
shown in columns (5) and (6), but it is not statistically significant.
More importantly, the coefficient of Congruence × Scandal is negative and statistically
significant in all specifications. According to the estimate in column (4), scandal decreases
the party vote percentage by 0.6 percent in low congruence districts (Congruence = 0.213,
one standard deviation below the mean). In contrast, scandal decreases the vote percentage
by 4.6 percent in high congruence districts (Congruence = 0.689, one standard deviation
above the mean).
I repeat the analysis using county level data and estimate the following model57:
DemV otect = β1 Pres V otect + β2 Scandaldt + β3Congruencect
β4Congruencect × Scandalct + δ′Xct + αc + θt + ct, (13)
where Pres V otect is the (interpolated) Democratic percentage of the two-party presidential
vote, and αc is a county fixed effect. Xct is a vector of county control variables: population
(logged), per capita income (logged), the share of urban population, population density
(logged), population aged 25 and older with 1–11 years of education and with more than 12
years of education (as a share of all population aged 25 and older), the share of people aged
65 or older, the share black, and the share female. Note that Congruence is now defined at
the county level (see Table 3.5 for summary statistics).
The results, reported in Table 3.7, are consistent with previous findings. Scandal decreases
the party vote percentage by about 3.8 to 4.6 percent (columns (1)–(3)). The negative effect
of scandal is greater in high congruence counties, as columns (4)–(6) show: the coefficient of
57Again, the elections immediately following redistricting are excluded except at-large districts – 1982,
1992, 2002, and Texas in 2004.
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Congruence × Scandal is negative and statistically significant. According to the estimate
in column (6), scandal decreases the vote percentage by 3.5 in low congruence counties
(Congruence = 0.201, one standard deviation below the mean), while it decreases the vote
percentage by 5.4 in high congruence counties (Congruence = 0.803, one standard deviation
above the mean,).
Table 3.7: Newspaper Market and the Effect of Scandal: County
Dependent Var = Democratic Vote Pct
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratic vote pct (Pres) 0.619 0.618
(0.016) (0.016)
Incumbent 13.147 13.049 12.218 13.144 13.045 12.218
(0.194) (0.193) (0.152) (0.195) (0.193) (0.152)
Scandal -3.770 -3.881 -4.588 -1.723 -1.704 -2.845
(0.451) (0.440) (0.436) (0.995) (0.949) (0.928)
Congruence 1.808 2.240 1.741
(0.785) (0.769) (0.589)
Congruence × Scandal -3.775 -4.011 -3.210
(1.363) (1.313) (1.265)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 16171 16171 16171 16171 16171 16171
R2 0.832 0.837 0.865 0.833 0.837 0.865
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. Year and county fixed effects included in all
regressions.
To address the concern that the effect of Congruence × Scandal may be due to some
characteristics of districts/counties that are correlated with Congruence, I add an interaction
of Scandal with each of district and county level control variable one at a time. The results,
reported in Appendix Table C.2 and Appendix Table C.3, remain similar.
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Discussion
The results of this paper show that voters punish the parties involved in scandals when
newspapers cover politicians in their district. They suggest that incumbent House members
may get away with their wrongdoings because of a poor fit between newspaper markets
and congressional districts. It is, however, only one explanation for why the majority of
politicians in scandals get elected. I find that even in high-congruence districts, parties in
scandals win more than half of the times. As previous studies suggest, voters may knowingly
vote for politicians in scandals because they weigh a charge of wrongdoing with various
factors such as partisanship or policy issues (e.g., Rundquist, Strom and Peters 1977). And
these trade-offs can undermine electoral accountability. For instance, if voters strongly care
about which party wins the election, they will vote for corrupt politicians even when they
prefer non-corrupt politicians (Eggers 2014).
Information problems can pose a more serious threat to political accountability. Well-
informed voters may be willing vote for a candidate implicated in a scandal if they think
that she/he will better represent them than other candidates. In contrast, ignorant voters
may vote for a politician involved in a scandal even when they want to elect a “clean”
candidate. The media can improve political accountability by providing information to the
latter type of voters. In fact, the results of this paper show that when newspapers cover
scandals, voters are more likely to punish the parties in scandals.
Although this paper mainly focused on scandals, it would be interesting to test whether the
media help voters make more informed decision in general using other measures of politicians’
quality or efforts. For instance, do the media help voters reward legislative efforts such as
legislative productivity or more federal money to their districts? Previous studies suggest
that voters reward such efforts (e.g., Levitt and Snyder 1997; Miquel and Snyder 2006).
Therefore, House members in districts congruent with media markets could be helped by the
media. However, if “bad news” get more attention than “good news” (e.g., Puglisi and Snyder
2008), productive incumbents would not necessarily do well in high-congruence districts. By
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studying these issues we can better understand the role of the media in promoting electoral
accountability.
68
Appendix for Chapter 1.
A.1. Data and Summary Statistics
A.1.1 Data
A.1.1.1 Television Market
To record television penetration at the county level, I use data on the availability of television
in each U.S. city from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR) Study 22720 by Gentzkow (2006). It uses various issues of Television Factbook, a
yearly data that contains information about each television station in the U.S. including its
location, signal strength, network affiliation, ownership, and starting date. He collects the
names and the start date of the first commercial television station in each media market. To
determine the first date when television entered each county, he uses the Designated Market
Area (DMA), developed by Nielsen Media Research, which assigns every county in the U.S.
to one DMA based on viewing patterns. I code a county as having television if it is in a
DMA of at least one commercial television station in a given year.58
A.1.1.2 Economic Variables
To assess how television affects economic voting, I use two economic variables: national and
state level income per capita data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the years 1944
to 196459 and national level unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.60 I
exclude the year 1944 from the sample when I use the unemployment rate variable, because
58Following Gentzkow (2006), I assign the year 1946 as the first television year for all the counties that
had television before 1946, because penetration of television was negligible before that year.
59Per capita income is in 1960 dollars.
60Unfortunately, the state level unemployment data is not available for the sample period of this study.
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unemployment data prior to 1947 is not directly comparable to the data since 1947.61
A.1.1.3 Newspaper Market
The main source of newspaper market data is Editor and Publisher Yearbook, which is an
annual publication that contains directories of U.S. newspapers. The directory has been
used by advertisers and intended to be complete (Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson 2011).62
From the directory, I collect each newspaper’s name, partisanship, frequency as well as size
of circulation, and city of publication for every presidential year from 1944 to 1964.
Since the unit of analysis is a county, I match each city to a county and construct data
at the county level. I count the number of Republican, Democratic, and Independent news-
papers in all cities that belong to the same county.63 Similarly, I aggregate circulation of
each type of newspaper at the county level. Unfortunately, the Yearbook does not provide
detailed information about where each newspaper is circulated. According to Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2010), the median newspaper circulates more than 80% of its papers in the county
where it is located, and the median county gets more than 80% of its copies from in county
newspapers today. Since improvements in transportation made it easier for newspapers to
circulate their copies outside their county, it would be safe to assume that pre-television local
newspaper markets were even smaller. Therefore, I define newspaper market as a county.
A.1.1.4 Election and Census Data
I also include a variety of demographic and socio-economic variables, measured at the county
level. More specifically, I extract the following variables from the U.S. census files from the
61While the unemployment rate estimates since 1947 are calculated based on persons 16 years of age and
over, the figures before 1947 are based on persons 14 years of age and over.
62While the Yearbook is considered as one of the authoritative sources and often used by historical re-
searchers (Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson 2011), the directory is not complete. I have found newspapers
from other sources that are not listed in the directory. But since the list is intended to be complete, I assume
that newspapers with large enough circulation to be valuable to advertisers are included in the directory.
63The Yearbook sometimes classifies a newspaper as “ID” or “IR,” which means Independent Democrat
and Independent Republican. I treated these papers as Independent. The results of the analyses in the
paper are similar when I classify these as partisan papers.
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ICPSR Study 2896 by Haines (2006): total population, population per square mile; the white
population; the female population; the population aged 21 and older; the population living
in towns with 25,000 or more residents; the population aged 25 and older; the population
aged 25 and older with more than 12 years of education; and the total dollar value of
manufacturing output. I linearly interpolate each number between census years.
Using these variables, I construct the share of white population, the share of females, the
share of population living in cities with 25,000 or more people, population aged 25 and older
with more than 12 years of education as a share of all the population aged 25 and older, and
the log of total dollar value of manufacturing output per-capita.64
Finally, I calculate the Democratic vote share in presidential elections from 1944 to 1964.
A.1.1.5 Newspaper Articles
To analyze the reporting behavior of partisan newspapers, I count the number of articles
mentioning presidential candidates of Democratic and Republican parties from newspaper-
archive.com using automated key-words based searching for every presidential election year
from 1944 to 1960.65 For each newspaper, I search for articles that contain the last name of
the candidate from each party and the word “election.” For instance, to count the number
of articles mentioning Democratic presidential candidate in 1948 published in newspaper i,
I search articles of newspaper i containing the words “Truman” and “election.” Then, using
the newspaper directory data from Editor and Publisher Yearbook, I collect partisanship,
frequency and size of circulation, city, and county of each newspaper.
A.1.1.6 Survey Data
To analyze the effect of television on media consumption behavior at the individual level, I
use the American National Election Study (NES) 1952, 1956, and 1960 (ICPSR study 7213
64All dollar values are in 1960 dollars.
65I used PERL scripts to automate the data-collection process.
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and 7252). I match counties in the NES data and counties in the television data to determine
whether respondents lived in areas with access to television.
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A.1.2 Summary Statistics
Appendix Table A.1: Summary Statistics: Newspaper Articles
Standard
Obs. Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Articles about Democratic Candidate 649 395 236 24 2201
Articles about Republican Candidate 649 406 260 24 1732
Relative Dem Hits 649 0.50 0.12 0.22 0.85
Democratic Vote Share 649 0.47 0.13 0.18 0.96
Appendix Table A.2: Summary Statistics: Economic Voting
Standard
Years Obs. Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
∆National Per Capita Income 1944–1964 14,881 3.04 1.95 0.07 5.89
∆State Per Capita Income 1944–1964 14,881 3.39 4.09 -13.90 21.87
TV Dummy (1 if TV) 1944–1964 14,881 0.60 0.49 0 1
∆National Unemployment Rate 1948–1964 12,561 0.25 0.18 0 0.5
TV Dummy (1 if TV) 1948–1964 12,561 0.71 0.45 0 1
All dollar values are in 1960 dollars.
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Appendix Table A.3: Summary Statistics: Newspaper Market
Standard
Obs. Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
TV Dummy (1 if TV) 4,752 0.59 0.49 0 1
Relative Democratic 4,752 -0.01 0.09 -0.51 0.59
Newspaper Circulation
The time period is 1944–1964.
Appendix Table A.4: Summary Statistics: Television and Newspaper Circulation
Standard
Obs. Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Circulation Per Thousand 5,484 244 135 12 2,374
TV Dummy (1 if TV) 5,484 0.59 0.49 0 1
TV Year 5,484 4.68 5.19 0 18
The time period is 1944–1964.
Appendix Table A.5: Summary Statistics: Media Use
Years Obs. Yes (1) No (0)
Campaign Info from Newspaper 1952 1,413 288 1,125
Campaign Info from TV 1952 1,413 686 727
TV Dummy (1 if TV) 1952 1,413 445 968
Campaign Info from Newspaper 1952–1960 3,905 854 3,051
Campaign Info from TV 1952–1960 3,905 1,096 2,809
TV Dummy (1 if TV) 1952–1960 3,905 508 3,397
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A.2. Robustness Checks
A.2.1 Matching
Appendix Figure A.1: Standardized Difference between Pre-Freeze and Post-Freeze Counties,
Before and After Matching
-100 -50 0 50 100
log_manu
age21pct
sch12
female
white
urban
popsq
pop
Unmatched Matched
This figure plots standardized difference in the pre-freeze and post-freeze counties on the set of covariates
before and after matching. I did one to one propensity score matching with a caliper of 0.05.
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Appendix Table A.6: Economic Voting and TV in Presidential Elections, Matched Sample
Dependent Var = Incumbent Vote Share
Per Capita Income (1944–1964) Unemployment (1948–1964)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TV 0.986 2.271 0.482 2.166 4.896 0.403 -0.260 1.296
(0.837) (0.805) (0.672) (0.738) (0.810) (0.940) (0.809) (1.034)
∆National Income -0.928
(0.177)
TV × ∆National Income 3.805 5.627 2.567 4.002
(0.249) (0.813) (0.729) (0.807)
∆National Unemployment -8.904
(0.580)
TV × ∆National Unemployment 10.821 7.005 3.722 5.258
(0.622) (1.166) (1.042) (1.301)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.046 -0.070 0.047 -0.072 -0.062 -0.062 0.032 -0.181
(0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.071) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.209)
Pct. Female 1.245 1.874 -1.131 -1.426 1.806 0.930 -1.343 -4.055
(0.391) (0.366) (0.425) (0.695) (0.356) (0.373) (0.502) (1.779)
Pct. Urban 0.040 -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.017 0.018 0.011 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
Population Per sq. Mile -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.013 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.030
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.013)
Pct. White -2.520 -2.431 0.243 3.923 -1.478 -1.407 0.559 7.960
(0.265) (0.254) (0.162) (0.622) (0.305) (0.313) (0.208) (1.146)
Pct. 21+ -2.371 -1.858 0.638 -1.363 -2.166 -2.174 0.494 -2.240
(0.166) (0.179) (0.148) (0.564) (0.170) (0.174) (0.153) (1.017)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.110 0.386 -0.218 -1.564 -0.062 -0.677 -0.316 -3.054
(0.072) (0.150) (0.116) (0.242) (0.074) (0.168) (0.133) (0.467)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output -0.185 0.275 1.597 2.466 0.796 0.129 1.401 3.623
(0.631) (0.636) (0.460) (1.036) (0.638) (0.659) (0.509) (1.624)
Fixed Effects County County County County County County County County
Year State-Year Year Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 10839 10839 10839 10839 9131 9131 9131 9131
This table replicates Table 1.3 using matched sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.
∆National Income and ∆National Unemployment are standardized.
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Appendix Table A.7: Economic Voting and TV in Presidential Elections (with State Econ-
omy Variable), Matched Sample
Dependent Var = Incumbent Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TV 0.802 1.927 0.361 2.078 1.425 2.233 0.474 2.176
(0.781) (0.808) (0.672) (0.738) (0.823) (0.807) (0.671) (0.739)
∆State Income 1.603 1.313 0.219 1.905 1.354 0.244
(0.182) (0.155) (0.101) (0.178) (0.156) (0.100)
TV × ∆State Income 1.541 1.048 0.732 1.195 -0.307 0.712 -0.527 0.982
(0.347) (0.381) (0.869) (0.384) (0.390) (0.377) (0.973) (0.388)
∆National Income -1.447
(0.163)
TV × ∆National Income 3.551 4.958 2.779 3.486
(0.272) (0.800) (0.829) (0.818)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.050 -0.071 0.048 -0.067 -0.050 -0.073 0.047 -0.071
(0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.070) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.071)
Pct. Female 1.131 1.696 -1.127 -1.503 1.098 1.690 -1.133 -1.491
(0.379) (0.365) (0.426) (0.695) (0.394) (0.365) (0.426) (0.695)
Pct. Urban 0.030 -0.002 0.006 0.008 0.038 -0.002 0.005 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Population Per sq. Mile -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.012 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.012
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Pct. White -2.396 -2.382 0.244 3.833 -2.429 -2.379 0.243 3.863
(0.256) (0.252) (0.163) (0.618) (0.260) (0.252) (0.163) (0.619)
Pct. 21+ -2.030 -1.773 0.635 -1.222 -2.192 -1.763 0.639 -1.238
(0.160) (0.178) (0.148) (0.561) (0.167) (0.178) (0.148) (0.562)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.163 0.336 -0.221 -1.558 0.129 0.340 -0.218 -1.553
(0.070) (0.148) (0.116) (0.242) (0.071) (0.148) (0.116) (0.242)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.117 0.368 1.592 2.416 0.071 0.388 1.596 2.443
(0.617) (0.634) (0.460) (1.035) (0.628) (0.633) (0.460) (1.034)
Fixed Effects County County County County County County County County
Year State-Year Year Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 10839 10839 10839 10839 10839 10839 10839 10839
This table replicates Table 1.4 using matched sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.
∆National Income and ∆State Income are standardized. The time period is 1944–1964.
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Appendix Table A.8: The Effect of Newspaper and TV on Democratic Vote Share in Presi-
dential Elections, Matched Sample
Dependent Var = Democratic Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TV 0.818 0.426 1.235
(0.403) (0.341) (0.436)
Relative Democratic Paper Circ 0.483 0.166 0.057 1.271 0.482 0.369
(0.232) (0.132) (0.225) (0.283) (0.157) (0.253)
TV × Relative Democratic Paper Circ -1.495 -0.583 -0.629
(0.273) (0.157) (0.270)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.082 -0.009 0.022 -0.078 -0.008 0.030
(0.018) (0.011) (0.044) (0.017) (0.011) (0.043)
Pct. Female 0.974 -0.621 0.456 0.894 -0.612 0.471
(0.452) (0.299) (0.698) (0.437) (0.300) (0.695)
Pct. Urban 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.016 0.008 0.021
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Population Per sq. Mile 0.008 -0.001 0.007 0.008 -0.000 0.007
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Pct. White -0.939 0.098 0.187 -0.914 0.087 0.186
(0.333) (0.219) (0.663) (0.334) (0.219) (0.661)
Pct. 21+ -1.501 -0.067 -0.465 -1.403 -0.051 -0.480
(0.156) (0.130) (0.348) (0.151) (0.129) (0.346)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.306 -0.206 0.319 0.327 -0.181 0.317
(0.156) (0.121) (0.173) (0.152) (0.121) (0.174)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output -1.464 0.762 1.241 -1.334 0.786 1.296
(0.741) (0.426) (0.789) (0.733) (0.425) (0.786)
Fixed Effects County County County County County County
Year State-Year Year Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 4848 4848 4848 4848 4848 4848
This table replicates Table 1.5 using matched sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.
Relative Democratic Paper Circ is standardized. The time period is 1944–1964.
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A.2.2 Pairing of Pre and Post-Freeze Counties
In this subsection, I address the concern that the difference between the counties where
television entered earlier and those that received television later might drive the main results.
Appendix Figure A.2 illustrates the distribution of the pre and post-freeze counties. The
figure shows that the pre-freeze counties are concentrated around the center of each media
market.
To compare counties that are similar on observed and unobserved attributes, I pair each
pre-freeze county to one post-county based on geographic proximity and demographic simi-
larity. I first identify all the centers of media markets66 that had television before the freeze
and exclude them from the sample. Then, for each pre-freeze county, I locate all the con-
tiguous post-freeze counties. Note that one pre-freeze county can have multiple post-freeze
counties that are contiguous to it. From among these post-freeze counties, I choose the one
that is most similar to the pre-freeze county in demographic characteristics. I throw out all
the pre-freeze counties that are not contiguous to at least one post-freeze county and all the
post-freeze counties not contiguous to at least one pre-freeze county.
The resulting sample is shown in Appendix Figure A.3. By restricting the sample to these
paired counties, I compare counties that are happened to be just inside a media market and
those that are just outside a media market. Appendix Figure A.4 plots the standardized
difference in the pre-freeze and post-freeze counties on the set of covariates. It shows that the
paired counties are indeed similar in demographic characteristics, even though the pairing is
based primarily on geographic proximity.
Appendix Tables A.9, A.10, and A.11 replicate the results in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5
respectively. These tables show that the main results reported in the text are robust to the
sample restriction.
66The center of a media market is defined as a county in which a television station is located.
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Appendix Figure A.2: Distribution of the Pre and Post-Freeze Counties, All Sample
Center
Pre-Freeze
Post-Freeze
Not in Sample
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Appendix Figure A.3: Distribution of the Pre and Post-Freeze Counties, Paired Sample
Pre-Freeze
Post-Freeze
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Appendix Figure A.4: Standardized Difference between Pre-Freeze and Post-Freeze Counties,
Before and After Pairing
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This figure plots standardized difference in the pre-freeze and post-freeze counties on the set of covariates
before and after pairing.
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Appendix Table A.9: Economic Voting and TV in Presidential Elections, Paired Sample
Dependent Var = Incumbent Vote Share
Per Capita Income Unemployment
(1944–1964) (1948–1964)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TV -0.857 0.985 3.840 -0.286
(1.568) (1.082) (1.437) (1.216)
∆National Income -1.106
(0.341)
TV × ∆National Income 4.140 5.215
(0.464) (0.995)
∆National Unemployment -8.598
(1.062)
TV × ∆National Unemployment 10.551 6.629
(1.103) (1.395)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.046 -0.058 -0.049 -0.055
(0.037) (0.033) (0.019) (0.019)
Pct. Female 1.929 2.048 2.029 1.036
(0.504) (0.509) (0.442) (0.466)
Pct. Urban 0.044 0.007 0.017 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
Population Per sq. Mile 0.012 0.014 0.020 0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011)
Pct. White -3.058 -2.930 -1.552 -1.535
(0.559) (0.532) (0.526) (0.547)
Pct. 21+ -2.660 -2.256 -2.510 -2.550
(0.316) (0.356) (0.328) (0.339)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.285 0.332 0.003 -0.865
(0.124) (0.301) (0.135) (0.340)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output -0.244 0.204 1.218 0.297
(1.221) (1.207) (1.188) (1.241)
Fixed Effects County County County County
Year Year
Observations 4746 4746 4001 4001
This table replicates Table 1.3 using paired sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by pair.
∆National Income and ∆National Unemployment are standardized. The time period is 1944–1964.
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Appendix Table A.10: Economic Voting and TV in Presidential Elections (with State Econ-
omy Variable), Paired Sample
Dependent Var = Incumbent Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TV -1.146 0.266 -0.374 0.991
(1.472) (1.087) (1.530) (1.085)
∆State Income 1.499 1.424 1.838 1.492
(0.363) (0.326) (0.363) (0.331)
TV × ∆State Income 1.717 0.741 -0.701 0.216
(0.679) (0.776) (0.813) (0.784)
∆National Income -1.576
(0.309)
TV × ∆National Income 4.024 4.881
(0.521) (1.008)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.053 -0.060 -0.050 -0.062
(0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.034)
Pct. Female 1.860 1.916 1.847 1.908
(0.484) (0.509) (0.502) (0.509)
Pct. Urban 0.032 0.007 0.042 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Population Per sq. Mile 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.014
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Pct. White -2.903 -2.866 -2.953 -2.863
(0.532) (0.523) (0.546) (0.525)
Pct. 21+ -2.331 -2.170 -2.498 -2.151
(0.304) (0.350) (0.317) (0.350)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.337 0.264 0.296 0.271
(0.123) (0.297) (0.122) (0.296)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.156 0.287 -0.034 0.294
(1.185) (1.202) (1.213) (1.198)
Fixed Effects County County County County
Year Year
Observations 4746 4746 4746 4746
This table replicates Table 1.4 using paired sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by pair.
∆National Income and ∆State Income are standardized. The time period is 1944–1964.
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Appendix Table A.11: The Effect of Newspaper and TV on Democratic Vote Share in
Presidential Elections, Paired Sample
Dependent Var = Democratic Vote Share
(1) (2)
TV -0.141
(0.522)
Relative Democratic Paper Circ 0.730 1.385
(0.300) (0.417)
TV × Relative Democratic Paper Circ -1.089
(0.363)
Controls
Population (Thousand) -0.028 -0.027
(0.015) (0.015)
Pct. Female -0.001 -0.000
(0.594) (0.584)
Pct. Urban 0.014 0.014
(0.006) (0.006)
Population Per sq. Mile -0.001 -0.001
(0.016) (0.016)
Pct. White -0.720 -0.697
(0.594) (0.602)
Pct. 21+ -1.617 -1.526
(0.211) (0.205)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.324 0.327
(0.207) (0.204)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output -1.496 -1.221
(1.083) (1.087)
Fixed Effects County County
Year Year
Observations 1458 1458
This table replicates Table 1.5 using paired sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by pair.
Relative Democratic Paper Circ is standardized. The time period is 1944–1964.
85
A.2.3 Auxiliary Regressions
A.2.3.1 National Economy, State Economy, and Television
To show that the state economy is not more closely tied to the national economy when
television is present, I estimate regressions of the following:
State Incomest = β0+β1 TVst+β2National Incomet+β3 TVst×National Incomet+st. (14)
Note that the variables are now defined at the state level. TVst is the share of the population
in state s in year t living in counties with television. All the variables except TV are
standardized. Appendix Table A.12 presents the result. In column (1), I use the level of
state and national income and in column (2), I use the one-year change in these economic
indicators. In both columns, the coefficient of TV×National Income is small and statistically
insignificant. The results suggest that television did not increase the effect of the national
economy on the state economy.
A.2.3.2 The Entry of Television and Partisan Newspaper Circulation
Next, I examine whether the entry of television is correlated with the partisan preference of
newspaper readers. I estimate the following model:
TVct = β PartisanPaper Circc(t−1) + γ′Xct + ct, (15)
where PartisanPaper Circc(t−1) is the total circulation of partisan newspapers divided by
the population in county c in year t − 1 and the vector Xct includes county level control
variables and fixed effects as described in the text following equation (1). If television enters
counties where newspaper readers are becoming less partisan, we would observe β < 0.
However, as shown in Appendix Table A.13, the coefficient of PartisanPaper Circ is close
to zero in all the specifications. The results indicate that the entry of television is not related
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to the partisan tastes of newspaper readers.
Appendix Table A.12: Auxiliary Regression: National Economy, State Economy and TV
Dependent Var =
State Income ∆State Income
(1) (2)
TV -0.550 -0.684
(1.817) (1.198)
National Income 0.426
(0.240)
TV × National Income 0.089
(0.239)
∆National Income 0.780
(0.220)
TV × ∆National Income 0.168
(0.273)
Observations 277 277
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. All the variables except TV are standardized. The time
period is 1944–1964.
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Appendix Table A.13: Auxiliary Regression: The Entry of TV and Partisan Newspaper
Circulation
Dependent Var = TV
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Partisan Paper Circ 0.011 0.008 0.009
(0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Population (Thousand) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Pct. Female 0.021 -0.005 -0.006
(0.016) (0.017) (0.044)
Pct. Urban 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Population Per sq. Mile -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pct. White 0.029 0.019 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.028)
Pct. 21+ 0.014 0.014 0.031
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015)
Pct. 12+ Yrs of Education 0.009 0.004 0.028
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
Log Per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.010 -0.015 0.016
(0.020) (0.019) (0.044)
Fixed Effects County County County
Year State-Year Year
County Trends No No Yes
Observations 4040 4040 4040
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. Lagged Relative Democratic Paper Circ is standardized.
The time period is 1944–1964.
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Appendix for Chapter 2.
Appendix Table B.1: List of Political Scandals
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
Rufus Brown Bullock Governor GA R Bribery 3/1870 to 5/1870 (1)
Roderick R. Butler Representative TN R Fraud & forgery 7/1870 to 1/1871 (1)
William Woods Holden Governor NC R Misuse of state militia 9/1870 to 3/1871 (1), (2)
David Christy Butler Governor NE R Corruption 1/1871 to 6/1871 (1), (2)
Thomas Osborn Senator FL R Bribery & fraud 4/1871 to 4/1871 (1)
William H. Bumsted Commiss Board of Works NJ R Conspiracy & fraud 9/1871 to 6/1872 (1)
Abraham Oakey Hall Mayor NY R Malfeasance 10/1871 to 11/1871 (1), (2)
William Magear Tweed State Senator NY D Embezzlement 10/1871 to 11/1873 (1), (2)
Alexander Caldwell Senator KS R Bribery 3/1872 to 3/1873 (1)
James Wood State Senator NY R Bribery 3/1872 to 9/1872 (1)
John F. Hartranft State Auditor PA R Corruption 8/1872 to 11/1872 (1)
Henry Wilson Senator MA R Bribery 9/1872 to 3/1873 (1)
Oakes Ames Representative MA R Bribery 9/1872 to 2/1873 (1), (2)
James Gillespie Blaine Speaker of the House ME R Bribery 9/1872 to 3/1873 (1)
James Brooks Representative NY D Bribery 9/1872 to 3/1873 (1), (2)
Henry Clay Warmouth Governor LA R Bribery 12/1872 to 1/1873 (2)
Lewis V. Bogy Senator MO D Bribery 1/1873 to 3/1873 (3)
Samuel Clark Pomeroy Senator KS R Bribery 1/1873 to 3/1875 (1)
William Seeger State Treasurer MN R Corruption 2/1873 to 5/1873 (2)
Edmund Jackson Davis Governor TX R Refusal to leave office 1/1874 to 1/1874 (2)
Josiah E. Hayes State Treasurer KS R High crimes & misdemean 1/1874 to 5/1874 (1)
William Adams Richardson U.S. Treasury Secretary USA R Tax revenue fraud (San-
born Case)
3/1874 to 5/1874 (2)
Franklin J. Moses Jr Governor SC R Fraud & malfeasance 5/1874 to 10/1874 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Appendix Table B.1 – (continued)
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
Tunis George Campbell State Senator GA R False convictions (while
Justice of the Peace)
1/1875 to 1/1877 (2)
John Godfrey Schumaker Representative NY D Bribery 1/1875 to 11/1875 (1)
Richard Chappel Parsons Representative OH R Bribery 1/1875 to 11/1875 (1)
William Smith King Representative MN R Bribery 1/1875 to 11/1875 (1)
Alexander K. Davis Lieutenant Governor MS R Bribery 9/1875 to 3/1876 (1)
Joseph Rodman West Senator LA R Bribery 1/1876 to 12/1876 (1)
Frederick Adolphus Sawyer Asst Treasury Secretary USA R Forgery & fraud 1/1876 to 10/1877 (1)
William Pitt Kellogg Governor LA R Embezzlement 2/1876 to 3/1876 (1)
George Eliphaz Spencer Senator AL R Bribery 2/1876 to 5/1876 (1)
William Worth Belknap Secretary of War USA R Bribery 2/1876 to 8/1876 (1), (2)
William Robert Taylor Governor WI D Corruption 3/1876 to 7/1876 (1)
James Gillespie Blaine Speaker of the House ME R Bribery & fraud 4/1876 to 6/1876 (1)
Rufus Brown Bullock Governor GA R Larceny 5/1876 to 1/1878 (1)
Michael Crawford Kerr Speaker of the House IN D Bribery 5/1876 to 6/1876 (1)
La Fayette Grover Senator OR D Bribery & fraud 3/1877 to 6/1878 (3)
John James Patterson Senator SC R Bribery 9/1877 to 1/1878 (1)
Robert Smalls Representative SC R Bribery 10/1877 to 11/1877 (1)
John O’Connor State Representative OH D False identity 4/1878 to 5/1878 (1)
John Sherman Senate, Sec of Treasury USA R Fraud 5/1878 to 6/1878 (1)
Stanley Matthews Senator OH R Fraud 5/1878 to 10/1878 (1)
La Fayette Grover Governor OR D Corruption & fraud 11/1878 to 2/1879 (1)
Stephen F Chadwick Governor OR D Corruption & fraud 11/1878 to 2/1879 (1)
Noble Andrew Hull House & Lt. Governor FL D Fraud 1/1879 to 1/1881 (1)
John J. Ingalls Senator KS R Bribery & fraud 2/1879 to 2/1880 (3)
Charles B. Salter State Representative PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
Emile J. Petroff State Representative PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
George F. Smith State Representative PA D Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
90
Appendix Table B.1 – (continued)
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
William Henry Kemble State Treasurer PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
William F. Rumberger State Representative PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
William Pitt Kellogg Senator LA R Bribery 6/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
Washington L. Goldsmith State Genl Comptroller GA D Embezzlement 8/1879 to 9/1879 (1)
John W. Renfroe State Treasurer GA D Embezzlement 9/1879 to 10/1879 (1)
Isaac Smith Kalloch Mayor CA D Bribery 5/1880 to 6/1880 (1)
Charles Henry Voorhis Representative NJ R Fraud & embezzlement 10/1880 to 10/1881 (1), (2)
William Mahone Senator VA R Corruption & conspiracy 3/1881 to 5/1881 (1)
Stephen Wallace Dorsey Senator AR R Fraud 4/1881 to 6/1883 (1), (2)
Thomas J. Brady Asst Postmaster General USA R Bribery 4/1881 to 7/1884 (1)
Henry M. Hoyt Governor PA R Corruption 5/1881 to 5/1881 (1)
Chauncey Depew Senate (candidate) NY R Bribery 6/1881 to 7/1881 (1)
Thomas J. Navin Mayor MI R Forgery 2/1882 to 3/1885 (1), (2)
Franklin J. Moses Jr Governor SC R Fraud 3/1882 to 6/1882 (1)
Daniel Wolsey Voorhees Senator IN D Corruption 5/1882 to 6/1882 (1)
Charles H. Houghton U.S. Collector of Customs USA R Fraud & embezzlement 5/1882 to 11/1882 (1), (2)
William Pitt Kellogg Senator LA R Bribery 7/1882 to 7/1884 (1)
Roscoe Conkling Senator NY R Bribery 8/1882 to 9/1882 (1)
William A. Wright State Representative OH D Bribery 11/1882 to 12/1882 (1)
William Bloch State Representative OH D Bribery 11/1882 to 3/1883 (1)
Marshall Tate Polk State Treasurer TN D Embezzlement 1/1883 to 7/1883 (1), (2)
James Gillespie Blaine Senator ME R Bribery & fraud 5/1884 to 9/1884 (1)
Franklin J. Moses Jr Governor SC R Fraud 10/1884 to 11/1885 (1)
John Rhoderic McPherson Senator NJ D Conspiracy & bribery 6/1885 to 9/1885 (1)
William Joyce Sewell Senator NJ R Conspiracy 6/1885 to 9/1885 (1)
Henry J. Coggeshall State Senator NY R Bribery 6/1885 to 11/1885 (1)
Henry B. Payne Senator OH D Bribery 1/1886 to 7/1886 (1)
Isham Greene Harris Senator TN D Bribery 2/1886 to 9/1886 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Appendix Table B.1 – (continued)
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
Augustus Hill Garland Attorney General USA D Bribery 2/1886 to 12/1886 (1)
John L. Brown State Auditor IA R Malfeasance 4/1886 to 7/1886 (1)
James Herrington Mayor IL D Malfeasance 4/1888 to 12/1888 (1)
Benjamin W. Roscoe City Treasurer NY D Bribery 3/1889 to 4/1890 (1)
William L. Hemingway State Treasurer MS D Embezzlement 2/1890 to 7/1890 (1)
Stevenson Archer State Treasurer MD D Embezzlement 3/1890 to 7/1890 (1)
Lee F. Wilson State Representative IN D Fraud 4/1890 to 6/1890 (1)
Eli J. Henkle Representative MD D Forgery 7/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
Daniel F. Beatty Mayor NJ D Violation of postal laws 10/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
John McLennan Alderman NY R Bribery 10/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
Sol Van Praag State Representative IL D Fraud & perjury 11/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
M.J. Doyle State Representative MI D Bribery 6/1891 to 7/1891 (1)
Charles W. Buttz Lobbyst ND R Bribery 5/1894 to 5/1894 (1)
George H. Morrison County Treasurer NY R Embezzlement 9/1896 to 11/1896 (1)
Joseph S. Bartley City Treasurer NE R Embezzlement 2/1897 to 6/1897 (1)
Henry Heitfeld State Senator ID D Bribery & fraud 3/1897 to 4/1897 (1)
W. Godfrey Hunter Senate (Candidate) KY R Bribery 4/1897 to 9/1897 (1)
Lant K. Salsbury City Attorney MI D Bribery 2/1901 to 12/1903 (1)
Albert Alonzo Ames Mayor MN D Bribery 6/1902 to 9/1903 (1)
John A. Lee Lieutenant Governor MO D Bribery 4/1903 to 11/1903 (1)
Frank H. Farris State Senator MO D Bribery 4/1903 to 8/1905 (1)
Edmund H. Driggs Representative NY D Fraud 6/1903 to 1/1904 (1)
George E. Green State Senator NY R Fraud 9/1903 to 6/1906 (1)
Charles H. Dietrich Senator NE R Bribery 11/1903 to 4/1904 (1)
Joseph Ralph Burton Senator KS R Bribery 1/1904 to 6/1906 (1)
Barney A. Eaton State Senator WI R Bribery 1/1904 to 3/1906 (1)
John H. Mitchell Senator OR R Bribery & fraud 1/1905 to 7/1905 (1)
Binger Hermann Representative OR R Fraud 1/1905 to 12/1910 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Appendix Table B.1 – (continued)
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
Frank D. Comerford State Representative IL D Bribery 2/1905 to 4/1905 (1)
John N. Williamson Representative OR R Conspiracy & fraud 2/1905 to 9/1905 (1)
Francis E. Warren Senator WY R Graft 2/1905 to 2/1905 (1)
William Leib U.S. Assistant Treasurer USA R Civil service law violation 9/1905 to 11/1905 (1)
Frank J. Gethro State Representative MA D Bribery 5/1906 to 6/1906 (1)
George L. Lilley Representative CT R Corruption 12/1908 to 1/1909 (1)
Isaac Stephenson Senator WI R Bribery 2/1909 to 3/1912 (1)
Arthur C. Harper Mayor CA D Bribery 1/1909 to 3/1909 (1)
Jotham P. Allds State Senator NY R Bribery 1/1910 to 3/1910 (1)
Lee O’Neil Browne State Representative IL D Bribery 4/1910 to 9/1910 (1)
William Lorimer Senator IL R Bribery 4/1910 to 7/1912 (1)
John Broderick State Senator IL D Bribery 5/1910 to 5/1911 (1)
Joseph S. Clark State Representative IL D Bribery & conspiracy 5/1910 to 3/1911 (1)
Stanton C. Pemberton State Senator IL R Bribery & conspiracy 5/1910 to 3/1911 (1)
Thomas Pryor Gore Senator OK D Bribery 6/1910 to 3/1911 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Appendix Table B.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Baseline Estimates
Standard
Min Max Mean Deviation N
Relative Hits -18.711 77.690 -0.015 5.353 3696
Scandal Hits/Total Hits 0.000 96.401 2.741 6.841 3696
Newspaper Frequency 0.143 1.000 0.681 0.410 3696
In-State Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.022 0.146 3696
In-Region Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.117 0.322 3696
Log Newspapers 0.000 2.303 1.266 0.650 3696
Opposition Party 0.000 1.000 0.362 0.481 3696
Own Party 0.000 1.000 0.470 0.499 3696
Overall Bias -1.000 1.000 -0.108 0.906 3696
Panel B: With Voter Partisanship
Standard
Min Max Mean Deviation N
Relative Hits -18.711 77.690 0.108 5.479 3316
Scandal Hits/Total Hits 0.000 96.401 2.925 7.087 3316
Newspaper Frequency 0.143 1.000 0.709 0.403 3316
In-State Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.024 0.153 3316
In-Region Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.127 0.333 3316
Log Newspapers 0.000 2.303 1.329 0.623 3316
Opposition Party 0.000 1.000 0.370 0.483 3316
Own Party 0.000 1.000 0.490 0.500 3316
Overall Bias -1.000 1.000 -0.120 0.919 3316
Voter Partisanship 0.022 0.980 0.487 0.153 3316
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Appendix Table B.3: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.372 0.243 0.287 0.215
(0.202) (0.215) (0.223) (0.225)
In-State Scandal 4.747 4.773 4.760 4.800
(1.429) (1.434) (1.435) (1.437)
In-Region Scandal 1.989 1.914 1.973 1.910
(0.670) (0.667) (0.674) (0.667)
Log Newspapers 0.472 0.366
(0.208) (0.209)
Opposition Party 0.859 0.863 2.462 2.396
(0.273) (0.272) (0.742) (0.759)
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers -1.200 -1.133
(0.400) (0.410)
Year -0.014 -0.019
(0.003) (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.232 -0.260
(0.432) (0.457)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.083 -0.985
(0.417) (0.406)
Share of Population that is White -0.027 -0.044
(0.619) (0.624)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -1.730 -0.700
(1.584) (1.619)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.146 0.133
(0.135) (0.128)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.837 0.831
(0.335) (0.334)
Log Population 0.277 0.278
(0.175) (0.167)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 1-4 of Table 2.3.
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Appendix Table B.4: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.405 0.298 0.391 0.301
(0.202) (0.210) (0.217) (0.217)
In-State Scandal 4.767 4.811 4.743 4.806
(1.423) (1.426) (1.439) (1.441)
In-Region Scandal 1.992 1.919 1.996 1.911
(0.669) (0.668) (0.674) (0.670)
Log Newspapers -0.310 -0.479
(0.196) (0.208)
Own Party -0.633 -0.689 -1.753 -2.085
(0.254) (0.260) (0.635) (0.676)
Own Party × Log Newspapers 0.864 1.061
(0.342) (0.369)
Year -0.014 -0.019
(0.002) (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.253 -0.350
(0.441) (0.470)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.196 -1.142
(0.443) (0.430)
Share of Population that is White -0.037 0.166
(0.628) (0.627)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -3.059 -4.264
(1.550) (1.663)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.202 0.210
(0.148) (0.146)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.694 0.732
(0.335) (0.339)
Log Population 0.226 0.223
(0.170) (0.161)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 5-8 of Table 2.3.
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Appendix Table B.5: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.387 0.273 0.345 0.260
(0.201) (0.212) (0.219) (0.221)
In-State Scandal 4.747 4.785 4.744 4.799
(1.426) (1.429) (1.438) (1.439)
In-Region Scandal 1.999 1.924 1.994 1.917
(0.671) (0.668) (0.676) (0.670)
Log Newspapers -0.005 -0.083
(0.153) (0.159)
Overall Bias 0.440 0.450 1.266 1.282
(0.151) (0.151) (0.399) (0.399)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers -0.627 -0.630
(0.214) (0.215)
Year -0.014 -0.020
(0.003) (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.240 -0.313
(0.436) (0.465)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.161 -1.074
(0.433) (0.419)
Share of Population that is White -0.031 0.079
(0.623) (0.622)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -2.471 -2.635
(1.562) (1.579)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.176 0.175
(0.141) (0.137)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.756 0.774
(0.334) (0.336)
Log Population 0.249 0.247
(0.172) (0.164)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 9-12 of Table 2.3.
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Appendix Table B.6: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.201 0.171 0.207 0.155
(0.216) (0.233) (0.233) (0.236)
In-State Scandal 4.789 4.853 4.830 4.888
(1.438) (1.444) (1.442) (1.446)
In-Region Scandal 1.865 1.793 1.862 1.785
(0.667) (0.656) (0.668) (0.656)
Log Newspapers 0.403 0.339
(0.242) (0.261)
Opposition Party 0.997 1.030 2.863 2.893
(0.328) (0.327) (0.879) (0.881)
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers -1.319 -1.311
(0.450) (0.454)
Voter Partisanship -1.094 -1.024 -1.406 -1.344
(0.866) (0.843) (0.875) (0.857)
Year -0.026 -0.030
(0.005) (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.228 -0.256
(0.546) (0.577)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -0.877 -0.719
(0.522) (0.521)
Share of Population that is White 0.376 0.349
(0.728) (0.749)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.734 -3.826
(2.264) (2.284)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.072 0.048
(0.197) (0.199)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 1.183 1.262
(0.383) (0.387)
Log Population 0.159 0.185
(0.197) (0.189)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 1-4 of Table 2.4.
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Appendix Table B.7: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.129 0.184 0.178 0.196
(0.219) (0.231) (0.232) (0.231)
In-State Scandal 4.801 4.895 4.859 4.923
(1.429) (1.429) (1.440) (1.442)
In-Region Scandal 1.861 1.802 1.855 1.784
(0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.656)
Log Newspapers -0.882 -0.849
(0.276) (0.276)
Own Party -0.896 -0.889 -2.897 -2.865
(0.315) (0.316) (0.883) (0.875)
Own Party × Log Newspapers 1.403 1.401
(0.450) (0.450)
Voter Partisanship -1.019 -0.884 -1.402 -1.244
(0.869) (0.845) (0.902) (0.879)
Year -0.027 -0.030
(0.005) (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.397 -0.681
(0.563) (0.634)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -0.869 -0.503
(0.525) (0.513)
Share of Population that is White 0.269 0.421
(0.740) (0.744)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.313 -3.030
(2.276) (2.289)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.120 0.073
(0.208) (0.205)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.979 1.057
(0.387) (0.389)
Log Population 0.088 0.119
(0.194) (0.186)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 5-8 of Table 2.4.
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Appendix Table B.8: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.160 0.179 0.190 0.176
(0.217) (0.232) (0.232) (0.233)
In-State Scandal 4.787 4.869 4.842 4.903
(1.433) (1.436) (1.441) (1.443)
In-Region Scandal 1.867 1.803 1.861 1.789
(0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.657)
Log Newspapers -0.234 -0.243
(0.167) (0.191)
Overall Bias 0.559 0.560 1.558 1.549
(0.186) (0.183) (0.471) (0.468)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers -0.720 -0.715
(0.237) (0.237)
Voter Partisanship -1.262 -1.145 -1.571 -1.447
(0.902) (0.876) (0.923) (0.900)
Year -0.028 -0.031
(0.006) (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.313 -0.477
(0.554) (0.607)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -0.888 -0.615
(0.527) (0.519)
Share of Population that is White 0.309 0.373
(0.734) (0.745)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.410 -3.284
(2.265) (2.293)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.094 0.059
(0.202) (0.201)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 1.070 1.150
(0.383) (0.386)
Log Population 0.122 0.150
(0.196) (0.187)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 9-12 of Table 2.4.
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Appendix Table B.9: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2)
Newspaper Frequency 0.293 0.227
(0.222) (0.223)
In-State Scandal 4.744 4.788
(1.436) (1.436)
In-Region Scandal 1.952 1.895
(0.671) (0.666)
Log Newspapers 0.376 0.296
(0.196) (0.202)
Opposition Party 2.266 2.191
(0.686) (0.699)
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers -1.002 -0.931
(0.357) (0.367)
Year -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Opposition Party × Year -0.041 -0.041
(0.018) (0.018)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.205
(0.453)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.086
(0.430)
Share of Population that is White -0.160
(0.644)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -0.766
(1.616)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.148
(0.133)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.795
(0.326)
Log Population 0.260
(0.166)
Observations 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 1-2 of Table 2.5.
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Appendix Table B.10: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2)
Newspaper Frequency 0.386 0.297
(0.218) (0.218)
In-State Scandal 4.735 4.795
(1.441) (1.444)
In-Region Scandal 1.986 1.900
(0.672) (0.668)
Log Newspapers -0.248 -0.416
(0.183) (0.196)
Own Party -1.578 -1.913
(0.575) (0.620)
Own Party × Log Newspapers 0.707 0.905
(0.308) (0.338)
Year -0.033 -0.034
(0.011) (0.010)
Own Party × Year 0.030 0.030
(0.017) (0.017)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.340
(0.466)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.158
(0.437)
Share of Population that is White 0.246
(0.630)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.109
(1.647)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.199
(0.143)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.695
(0.330)
Log Population 0.236
(0.163)
Observations 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 3-4 of Table 2.4.
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Appendix Table B.11: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2)
Newspaper Frequency 0.345 0.263
(0.220) (0.220)
In-State Scandal 4.731 4.787
(1.440) (1.440)
In-Region Scandal 1.977 1.901
(0.672) (0.668)
Log Newspapers -0.013 -0.076
(0.154) (0.158)
Overall Bias 1.158 1.173
(0.365) (0.366)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers -0.531 -0.532
(0.192) (0.194)
Year -0.025 -0.024
(0.006) (0.005)
Overall Bias × Year -0.020 -0.020
(0.010) (0.010)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.281
(0.459)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.133
(0.435)
Share of Population that is White 0.076
(0.629)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -2.576
(1.579)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.175
(0.138)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.731
(0.326)
Log Population 0.247
(0.165)
Observations 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 5-6 of Table 2.4.
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Appendix for Chapter 3.
C.1. Scandal List
Appendix Table C.1: List of Scandals
State Election Year District Name Party Result Sample
DE 1982 1 EVANS, THOMAS BEVERLY, JR. R lost District
CA 1984 8 DELLUMS, RONALD V. D won District
CO 1984 3 STRANG, MICHAEL L. R won District/County
ID 1984 2 HANSEN, GEORGE V. R lost District/County
IL 1984 19 CRANE, DANIEL BEVER R lost District/County
MA 1984 10 STUDDS, GERRY E. D won District/County
NY 1984 9 FERRARO, GERALDINE A. D retired District/County
OH 1984 1 LUKEN, THOMAS ANDREW D won District/County
OH 1984 21 STOKES, LOUIS D won District/County
TN 1984 6 GORDON, BART J. D won District/County
TN 1984 8 JONES, EDWARD (ED) D unopposed District
TX 1984 2 WILSON, CHARLES D won District/County
UT 1984 2 MONSON, DAVID S. R won District/County
VA 1984 5 DANIEL, W.C. (DAN) D won District
CA 1986 15 COELHO, ANTHONY LEE (TONY) D won District
CA 1986 21 FIEDLER, BOBBI R retired District
CA 1986 41 LOWERY, WILLIAM DAVID (BILL) R won District
CT 1986 2 MULLEN, FRANCIS M. (BUD) R lost District/County
GA 1986 4 JONES, BEN L. D lost District/County
ID 1986 2 STALLINGS, RICHARD HOWARD D won District/County
IL 1986 8 ROSTENKOWSKI, DANIEL DAVID D won District/County
KY 1986 4 MANN, TERRY L. D lost District/County
MD 1986 7 MFUME, KWEISI D won District/County
NC 1986 7 ROSE, CHARLES G. D won District/County
Source: Hirano and Snyder (2012) and Basinger et al. (2014)
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Appendix Table C.1 – (continued)
State Election Year District Name Party Result Sample
NM 1986 2 RUNNELS, MIKE D lost District/County
NM 1986 3 RICHARDSON, WILLIAM B. (BILL) D won District/County
OR 1986 4 WEAVER, JAMES D retired District/County
PA 1986 3 ROVNER, ROBERT A. R lost District/County
PA 1986 15 RITTER, DONALD LAWRENCE R won District/County
RI 1986 1 ST. GERMAIN, FERNAND J. D won District/County
TX 1986 14 SWEENEY, DAVID MCCANN (MAC) R won District/County
TX 1986 20 GONZALEZ, HENRY B. D won District
TX 1986 25 ANDREWS, MICHAEL (MIKE) D won District
VA 1986 2 CANADA, A. JOSEPH R lost District/County
CA 1988 12 KONNYU, ERNEST L. R lost nomination District
CA 1988 36 BROWN, GEORGE EDWARD, JR. D won District
CA 1988 44 BATES, JIM D won District
ID 1988 2 STALLINGS, RICHARD HOWARD D won District/County
MD 1988 1 DYSON, ROYDEN PATRICK (ROY) D won District/County
MI 1988 11 IRWIN, MITCH D lost District/County
MO 1988 8 EMERSON, BILL R won District/County
NC 1988 7 ROSE, CHARLES G. D won District/County
NY 1988 19 BIAGGI, MARIO R lost District/County
OH 1988 17 TRAFICANT, JAMES A., JR. D won District/County
OH 1988 20 OAKAR, MARY ROSE D won District/County
OK 1988 1 INHOFE, JAMES M. R won District/County
PA 1988 22 MURPHY, AUSTIN J. D won District/County
RI 1988 1 ST. GERMAIN, FERNAND J. D lost District/County
TN 1988 2 DUNCAN, JOHN J. R won District/County
TN 1988 9 FORD, HAROLD E. D won District
TX 1988 20 GONZALEZ, HENRY B. D won District/County
AL 1990 2 DICKINSON, WILLIAM LOUIS R won District/County
CA 1990 15 COELHO, ANTHONY LEE (TONY) D resigned District
CA 1990 17 PASHAYAN, CHARLES (CHIP), JR. R lost District
Source: Hirano and Snyder (2012) and Basinger et al. (2014)
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Appendix Table C.1 – (continued)
State Election Year District Name Party Result Sample
CA 1990 28 DIXON, JULIAN CAREY D won District
CA 1990 31 DYMALLY, MERVYN M. D won District
CA 1990 37 WAITE, RALPH H. D lost District
CA 1990 44 BATES, JIM D lost District
FL 1990 4 JAMES, CRAIG TAYLOR R won District/County
GA 1990 6 GINGRICH, NEWTON LEROY R won District/County
HI 1990 1 ABERCROMBIE, NEIL D won County
IA 1990 2 TAUKE, THOMAS JOSEPH D retired District/County
IL 1990 2 SAVAGE, AUGUSTUS A. (GUS) D won District/County
IL 1990 16 HALLOCK, JOHN W., JR. R lost District/County
IN 1990 2 SHARP, PHILIP RILEY D won District/County
MA 1990 4 FRANK, BARNEY D won District/County
MD 1990 1 DYSON, ROYDEN PATRICK (ROY) D lost District/County
MN 1990 6 SIKORSKI, GERALD EDWARD (GERRY) D won District
MN 1990 7 STANGELAND, ARLAN INGEHART R lost District
NM 1990 1 VIGIL-GIRON, REBECCA D. D lost District/County
NY 1990 6 FLAKE, FLOYD H. D won District/County
NY 1990 18 GARCIA, ROBERT D resigned District
NY 1990 24 SOLOMON, GERALD B. R won District/County
OH 1990 8 LUKENS, DONALD E. R resigned District/County
PA 1990 7 WELDON, CURT R won District
PA 1990 10 MCDADE, JOSEPH M. R unopposed District
TN 1990 9 FORD, HAROLD E. D won District/County
TX 1990 12 WRIGHT, JAMES CLAUD, JR. D resigned District
TX 1990 13 SARPALIUS, BILL D won District/County
UT 1990 3 SNOW, KARL N., JR. R lost District/County
VA 1990 8 MORAN, JAMES P. (JIM), JR. D won District/County
WV 1990 4 RAHALL, NICK JOE, II D won County
CA 1994 41 KIM, JAY C. R won District
CA 1994 43 CALVERT, KENNETH STANTON (KEN) R won District
Source: Hirano and Snyder (2012) and Basinger et al. (2014)
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Appendix Table C.1 – (continued)
State Election Year District Name Party Result Sample
CT 1994 2 GEJDENSON, SAMUEL (SAM) D won District
GA 1994 6 GINGRICH, NEWTON LEROY R won District
IL 1994 5 ROSTENKOWSKI, DANIEL DAVID D lost District
MI 1994 8 CHRYSLER, RICHARD R. (DICK) R won District
NV 1994 1 BILBRAY, JAMES H. D lost District
NV 1994 2 GREESON, JANET D lost District
NY 1994 4 FRISA, DANIEL R won District
OH 1994 10 GAUL, FRANCIS E. D lost District
OR 1994 5 KOPETSKI, MIKE D retired District
PA 1994 10 MCDADE, JOSEPH M. R won District
TN 1994 3 WAMP, ZACH R won District
TX 1994 13 SARPALIUS, BILL D lost District
TX 1994 14 LAUGHLIN, GREG H. D won District
TX 1994 18 WASHINGTON, CRAIG A. D lost nomination District
TX 1994 24 FROST, JONAS MARTIN, III D won District
WA 1994 5 FOLEY, THOMAS S. D lost District
CA 1996 36 HARMAN, JANE D won District
CA 1996 37 TUCKER, WALTER R. D resigned District
CA 1996 41 KIM, JAY C. R won District
CT 1996 2 GEJDENSON, SAMUEL (SAM) D won District
GA 1996 6 GINGRICH, NEWTON LEROY R won District
ID 1996 1 CHENOWETH, HELEN P. R won District
IL 1996 2 REYNOLDS, MELVIN J. (MEL) D resigned District
IN 1996 2 MCINTOSH, DAVID MARTIN R won District
MI 1996 10 BONIOR, DAVID E. D won District
MI 1996 15 COLLINS, BARBARA-ROSE D lost nomination District
MO 1996 3 GEPHARDT, RICHARD A. (DICK) D won District
MT 1996 1 YELLOWTAIL, BILL D lost District
NC 1996 2 FUNDERBURK, DAVID R lost District
NJ 1996 12 ZIMMER, DICK R retired District
Source: Hirano and Snyder (2012) and Basinger et al. (2014)
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Appendix Table C.1 – (continued)
State Election Year District Name Party Result Sample
NY 1996 22 SOLOMON, GERALD B. R won District
OK 1996 4 WATTS, JULIUS C., JR. R won District
OR 1996 1 FURSE, ELIZABETH D won District
OR 1996 5 BUNN, JAMES LEE (JIM) R lost District
PA 1996 9 SHUSTER, E.G. (BUD) R won District
PA 1996 10 MCDADE, JOSEPH M. R won District
TN 1996 6 GORDON, BART J. D won District
TX 1996 2 WILSON, CHARLES D retired District
TX 1996 26 ARMEY, RICHARD K. (DICK) R won District
UT 1996 2 WALDHOLTZ, ENID GREENE R retired District
VA 1996 7 BLILEY, THOMAS J., JR. R won District
WA 1996 7 MCDERMOTT, JAMES A. (JIM) D won District
WI 1996 4 KLECZKA, GERALD D. (JERRY) D won District
CA 1998 41 KIM, JAY C. R lost nomination District/County
CA 1998 46 SANCHEZ, LORETTA D won District/County
FL 1998 3 BROWN, CORRINE D won District/County
FL 1998 12 CANADY, CHARLES T. R won District
GA 1998 6 GINGRICH, NEWTON LEROY R won District/County
ID 1998 1 CHENOWETH, HELEN P. R won District/County
IL 1998 6 HYDE, HENRY JOHN R won District/County
IL 1998 12 COSTELLO, JERRY F. D won District/County
IN 1998 6 BURTON, DANNY L. (DAN) R won District/County
OK 1998 4 WATTS, JULIUS C., JR. R won District/County
PA 1998 9 SHUSTER, E.G. (BUD) R won District
TX 1998 22 DELAY, THOMAS D. (TOM) R won District/County
UT 1998 2 COOK, MERRILL A. R won District/County
WA 1998 7 MCDERMOTT, JAMES A. (JIM) D won District
AL 2000 7 HILLIARD, EARL FREDERICK D won District/County
FL 2000 3 BROWN, CORRINE D won District/County
GA 2000 7 BARR, BOB R won District/County
Source: Hirano and Snyder (2012) and Basinger et al. (2014)
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Appendix Table C.1 – (continued)
State Election Year District Name Party Result Sample
NC 2000 11 TAYLOR, CHARLES H. R won District/County
PA 2000 9 SHUSTER, E.G. (BUD) R unopposed District
TX 2000 22 DELAY, THOMAS D. (TOM) R won District/County
VA 2000 8 MORAN, JAMES P. (JIM), JR. D won District/County
CA 2004 22 THOMAS, WILLIAM MARSHALL (BILL) R won District
MI 2004 7 SMITH, NICK H. R retired District/County
MI 2004 10 MILLER, CANDICE S. R won District/County
MI 2004 14 CONYERS, JOHN, JR. D won District/County
MO 2004 5 MCCARTHY, KAREN D retired District/County
NC 2004 10 BALLENGER, T. CASS R retired District/County
OH 2004 4 OXLEY, MICHAEL G. R won District/County
OH 2004 14 LATOURETTE, STEVEN C. R won District/County
OR 2004 1 WU, DAVID (DAVE) D won District/County
PA 2004 7 WELDON, CURT R won District/County
VA 2004 2 SCHROCK, ED R retired District/County
WA 2004 7 MCDERMOTT, JAMES A. (JIM) D won District/County
Source: Hirano and Snyder (2012) and Basinger et al. (2014)
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C.2. Robustness Check
Appendix Table C.2: Newspaper Market and the Effect of Scandal (District)
Adding Interaction of
Scandal with: Coefficient Std Error N
Share urban -5.305 3.437 3187
Log(Population per sq. mile) -8.383 3.846 3187
Median income (logged) -5.639 3.215 3187
Share older than 65 -5.508 3.091 3187
Share military population -5.806 3.075 3187
Share employed in farming -4.269 3.195 3187
Share foreign born -10.350 3.641 3187
Share blue collar workers -5.412 3.065 3187
This table replicates column (4) of Table 3.6 and add each interaction term
as additional control. Cell entries are coefficients and standard errors of
Congruence × Scandal.
110
Appendix Table C.3: Newspaper Market and the Effect of Scandal (County)
Adding Interaction of Scandal with: Coefficient Std Error N
Log(Population) -2.840 1.294 16171
Log(Population per sq. mile) -2.959 1.318 16171
Share urban -3.119 1.252 16171
Share with high school education -3.763 1.271 16171
Share with more than high school education -3.350 1.241 16171
Log(Per capita income) -3.107 1.224 16171
Share younger than 20 -2.715 1.304 16171
Share older than 65 -3.060 1.262 16171
Share black -3.693 1.271 16171
Share female -3.474 1.270 16171
This table replicates column (6) of Table 3.7 and add each interaction term as additional
control. Cell entries are coefficients and standard errors of Congruence × Scandal.
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